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In the Supi'eme Court of the State of Utah 
. EAST BENCH IRRIGATION CO., 
et al. Respondents, 
vs. 





This action is a consolidation of twenty-three 
separate actions filed in the District Court of the Sixth 
Judical District in the County of Garfield. All are 
appeals from the decisions of the State Engineer of 
the State of Utah· denying the twenty-three separate 
application~ for permanent change. of point of diversion, 
place and nature of use of water of Sevier River in Gar-
field and Piute Counties. 
This appeal is of major importance. The decision 
here will affect all of the principal water users along the 
225 mile_ length of the main channel of the Sevier 
River. The plaintiffs and respondents comprise the 
prinicipal water users in Panguitch and Circle Valleys 
and the defendants and appellants are all of the major 
canal and reservoir companies below those Valleys. 
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2 
Respondents between the 23rd day of S~pte~ber, 
1948, ~~~q the ~ 1th d~y- of Septe~ber, ~~4:~, f~l~?- ~~~ 
~ • • .... -. -.. " t ". •-' .·. . ~ . -, ·' • 
the State Engin~er ·23 applications for authority to 
change the point of diversion, place and nature of use 
of the waters of the Seyier ~~y~r (fls. ~x~. ~ a~q ~). 
Included therein wer~ applications for authority to take 
wat~rs frqm the Sevier River and anply them to 5000 
acres of undeveloped raw sagebr~sh land fa~ r~mov~q 
from the river. the appl1cations recited. that it was the 
intention of the respondents to build a reservoir near 
Hatch Town, Garfield County, Utah, and there store 
the waters of the river until released at such time and 
in such amounts as respondents might determine, for use 
~ ' • .~ • .j. ~ • 'I • •· 0' < 
upon the 5000 acres of land or for use upon lands then 
~ . - ' 
under cultivation- along the· river~ or ·for both such 
pses. Protests to the app~ic~tions we:r:~ fileq by the 
J I • ;· , ~ I • _, ~ ' • ! !' '·, f ~· ,;: , 1 ' •' : ! I '.~' 
qefendant ca11:~h irr~?ation ~~d res~ryo~r. compa~~es. 
Several hearings were held by the State Engineer 
for the purpose of receiving evidence for and against 
'/' 
the granting of the applications. On March 16, 1951, 
Joseph M. '·Tracy, State Engineer of the State of Utah; 
rejected each of' the· applications 
'' ... for the reason that it would constitute an en-
largement' of the original right, adversely eri ~t 
existing rights, and by reason of indefinite 
:peri~q o_f ~~.a.nge, impose an ~:mpossible proble~ 
of distribution on the Water Commissioner.,, 
(Sta~~ Engine~r-'s Exhibit 1, application No. 
a-2372) · · · · ~ . , . 
In q.u~ cours~ the plaintiffs appealed to the District 
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Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of 
Utah, in and for Garfield. c·ounty. Th~J co~phiinfs ·,a:Fe 
. . ' ' . '• . . I • 
simple in form and consist of five short paragr'aphs, 
alle~ng that a re~iew is sought by th~ plaintiffs of'the 
decision .of the State Engi~eer, Joseph ·M.· Tr:acy ;; ·thiat 
plaintiffs filed applications r'or a .permal1~~nt ·change ·~f 
point of diversiori to permit plaintiffs tot change the man-
~e·r- of use of water ftom ~direct flow to a direct flow a~d 
storage right in a reservoir' ·to be constr~cte~l; th~t th~ 
State Engineer hea~d the ~pplieatio.ns 'aft~r 'du~ notice 
and. there~iter de~ied the applicatio~s, and tha·t pl~iri­
tiffs ~ ~ppeal fro~ the decis~o~· of' ·the'i Slate· Engine~~ 
T , ~· • - •. ' ' ·' I 4 
and request the court to re~ew 'the applications. . . . ' 
P11rsuant. t~ ~tlnul~t~on of t~e p~~t~~~' fh.~ cplfl;t 
~ad~ a~ o:r:q~~ c~n~9liq~ttng t~~ t~enty-t:qr~e ~a~~~ ~:g.tp 
qne action. Tp~ q~fe~da~t.~ ~~~~ered, a~l~ging t4~t th~ 
p-~:op~sal~ q~ t¥e pla~n ti+f~ !V8~l4 g~~at~y @p~i~ t.~~ 
~~steq rig¥ts ~~ t~~ (}~f~:p.~a:nt~; tl}at appr~v~l of t~e 
applicatiqn~ ~<?~~~ c~~st~tTI-t~ a~ Ulllawful ~¥la.rg~J!l~~t 
- . ' ' . : . ~ - , 
of the rights of th~ plaintiffs; that the waters Rf the 
"' - - , • • . •.• • • ~ • • ~ , t , • ! ; : ' I , ~ r ;. L L ~· ' 1 .' JJ 
Sevier River had been ther~tofore fully app:r;opriate~ 
a~d that to ~pply water f~r ~ i~rlgation prtrp·~~es o~· ~~w 
"• 'f .- t • • ' t ' •". ,.. . ' '. l ~ • . • 1 _; .,.. ; ~ -.' '- ' ~ ~ 4 ~ f :._ '· ~· ...._ I -. ',I ~ ', ': -~, 
land would mcrease the cqnsumptive us~, change the 
, (. .f ~ ~ \ 1 r , ,; I ~ ·, ' • ~.. , , ' 1 ;, ' ~ • ' 1 ·' ' • • • .- ·~ 1· :•, ~ I : (·"' tin.~e and quantity of the return flo-w: to the riyer a~d 
u~~et the entire river system as it h~d be~n ~~ini~ter~J 
for many years by the Stat~ Engineer through the 
,_;' ' ~ ' • l ' ' ! ' ' •; I I ~ ! .' \ '' , 
River Commissioners. 
The defendants also alleged that there had been 
a general adjudication of the right to the use of the 
I. 
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4 
waters of the Sevier River, known as the Cox Decree, 
and that in such general adjudication the parties and the 
court all re~ognized. that the use of the water rights 
of the river were to be limited by geographical and 
climatic conditions· that the construction and operation 
' of the proposed Hatch Town reservoir would deprive 
the defendants and their stockholders of waters which 
the defendants had appropriated, stored and used for 
more than thiro/ years, and that ·the defendants would 
suffer great and irreparable injury if the Hatch Town 
Reservoir were constructed and water impounded there-
in; that the plaintiffs had failed to use for more than 
twenty years the water that they now claim to have 
been awarded to them by the Cox Decree. It was further 
:1.\lleged by the defendants that the diversion and storage 
applied for by the plaintiffs would be incapable of 
administration and would impose a burden in the dis-
tribution of the waters of the river impossible to dis-
charge without injuring numerous defendants. 
The case came on for trial before the Hon. Lewis 
Jones,, District Judge, and thereafter the court made its 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree, approv-
ing on condition the applications and reversing the order 
of the. State Engineer. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
History of the River 
The Sevier River is unique in many respects. It is 
the longest river system completely contained in the 
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State of Utah. It rises in Ka~e and Garfield Counties 
and flows in a northerly direction through Garfield, 
Piute, Sevier, Sanpete and Juab Counties, until it 
emerges on the Sevier desert near the town of Leaming-
ton in Millard County, Utah. At this point it courses in 
a southwesterly direction in Millard County and is 
entirely consumed before reaching Sevier Lake into 
which it once flowed. From its source to Sevier Lake, 
the distance is approximately 225 miles. (Defs. Ex. 54,. 
pages 10-11) 
During its entire course, until it reaches the Sevier 
Desert in Millard County, the river flows through com-
paratively narrow valleys between two mountain ranges; 
the valleys sloping on each side toward the main chan-
nel of the river. This results in return seepage ·to the 
river where the waters ~re again used by appropriators 
further down the stream. 
It was apparent soon ·after the irrigation use of 
the Sevier River began that much of the water diverted 
from the stream and applied to contiguous lands soon 
found its way back into the river. This fact is of prime 
importance to the users of the stream because the re-
turn water is available for rediversion at places lower 
down the river. So marked is this tendency to return 
seepage that not far below tight dams that divert the 
entire flow of the river during the irrigation season, 
the river contains at the lower p·oint as much water as 
it does above the dam.s. Thus, under present conditions 
there is a quantity of water available for irrigation 
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6 
of lands along the river's length greatly 1n excess of 
the obs.erve<f flow a.t any o~e point on the river. (Defs. 
Ex. 54,-Pages 68~69) · · .: · · \ 
t ! 
+t has ~een said rep~atedly, ~~d ~s p~qpabl~ tru~, 
that the waters of the Sevier Riv~r are1 mqre cq~plet~ly 
u.tiliz,ed f~~ .. i;~igati~n th~u th.p-~e- of any otne:r riveJ; i~ 
t:P.e ~orld.·. Yet, ~t- .;~s re~ognized as ea.J;lY ~~ 18~9 t4~t 
the 1Vater ~11pply <?f th~ Se~er ~iy~r ~~- ~~s11f~~~~~11,t 
for all of the fertile lands within the reach pf the :river 
r,' ,. ! ~ - • . '.. ~ ·~. I ~ • -. • ·., ) .... • ' • ' • • 
or its tributaries. (Defs. Ex. 54, Page 1) T~~ a~ou~~ ~f 
arable land to which water might be applied by pro-
posed canals is greatly in excess of the' surface 'water 
supply (Defs. Ex. 54, Page · 65). Because of su~h 
shortage,' the inevitable result has been over-develop-
ment of cleared lands and. continuous litigation of water 
rights. Prior to the entry of the Cox Decree on ·Novem-
ber 30, 1936, more .. than forty-five separate Decrees were 
entered, defining water rights in the Sevier Lake Basirt. 
(D~fs. Ex. 54, Page 66), 
. .,.!;. : L ... ' 
Prior to the Cox Decree the two principal Decrees 
were the Higgins Decree entered in 1901, defin'ing the 
f , 1 • • , r 
rights on the lower zone of the river (administering the 
waters of the river below the intake of the westview 
Canal in -Sanpete County to the lowest diversion on the 
Sevier River), .. and the Morse Decree of 1906, which set 
forth the rights on the upper zone (above the dam of the 
Vermillion Irrigation Company just east of Redmond in 
Sevier County to the uper source of the Sevier River). 
(Defs. Ex. 54. Page 67) 
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Both of these decrees were entered prior to the 
construction of. the Sevier Bridge and Piute Reservoirs 
. ,· ' : . ' ! , . . ~· . 
and were therefore concerned with the prilnary, . direct 
flow rights. In August 1902, c~rtain of ·the defendants 
appropriated tb.e waters and filed on a reservoir site 
in Juab County, Utah, and began the c~nstr~ction of a 
dam at what is now }{nown ~s Sevier Bridge. The dam 
and reser~~ir were designed to place under irrigation a 
large acr~age of undeveloped la~d in Millard County, 
Utah, and in all more than 70,000 ·acres of land have 
~een reclaimed and plac~4 u~d~r cultivation by reason 
... ' ;' • ~ .;. ' ;; - • f ~ { '\. '• I 1 0 } \. l :· : 
of the waters so appropriated and impounded in th~ 
! f · · . . ; . · · t '· - • : '·. . '· ' : . ' •. ,·I ·: . <·I . . ; ; ' ! 
Sevier Bridge Reservoir..· The reservoir in· 1912 was 
: • .: :·. ' - j ~. ·- ... -~ : ~ ~ / •• : • ~ • ~ .. ~ ~· f • : f . ·. : ,'' . ~ 
completed to hold water at its 60-foot contour level. 
i- , -, .:._ ~ .... ~ . l • ' _- • ... f i . , - "': ; .: j ·, '7 ~- • .. • • I'" ~ • ~ f -~ ,,~· .' ) 
In 1913 plans were app:r;oved' for enlarging the r~servoiJ; 
• i. .. ' ' . . • f ~ ' ~ . ' ~:: t '· ' I • ' ' ' ~ :, . ' , / ) • • ·11 -~ • ,'. 1 ., , •·. • • .• 
to a height of 90 feet, and this Work Wa~ COPJ.pleted J"Q.ne-
. : · .... ' :· .. ' . ; . -~-- . ~ ' ' ~ ~ : . 
17, 1916. The reservoir was built entirely with p'rivate 
funds and has a capacity· of 235,962 acre feet. ·It is 
owned jointly by the Defendants; Deseret I'rrigation 
Company, Melville Irrigation Company, Delta Canai 
Company, Abraham Irrigation Company and the Cen-
tral Utah Water Company. 
The Piute Reservoir was commenced in 1906 by 
the Ottgr Creek Re.~ervoir C~~pany at a . site in Piute 
County nea~ the town 'of M~rysv~le~ It was ~omplet~d 
by the State of Utah after the State purchased the water 
rights an:d reser~oir sit~ fro~ the Otter Creek R~servoir 
·Company. Sto~age be~an in the year ~910, a.nd the 
reservoir was ~ully completed about 1912. ~he reservo~~ 
h~s an actual capacity oi 84,000 acre feet, but its usable 
) l · ::. . · · · ... r ·•• 
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capacity at the present time 1s approximately 74,000 
acre feet. (Defs. Ex. 54, Page 125) 
As a result of the appropriation of such waters and 
the construction of said reservoirs numerous communi-
ties wholly dependent upon the waters therein have 
been established in Sevier, Sanpete and Millard Coun-
ties, and the waters. so impounded and appropriated 
constitute the sole support of thousands of inhabitants 
of those counties. 
The Hatch Town Reservoir in Garfield County was 
begun in 1906 by the State Land Board and was com-
pleted in the Spring of 1909. The dam failed and washed 
out during May, 1914, and has not been rebuilt. In effect 
the. Hatch Town projec~ since 1914 has heen abandoned. 
(Defs. Ex. 54, Page 156) 
The Higgins Decree of 1901 and the Morse Decree 
of 1906 became inadequate to meet the conditions that 
had grown more complex by new developments along the 
river requiring water. The State Engineer, in connection 
'vith the Federal Geological Survey, recognized the need 
for additional study of the flow of the river. During 
the years 1914 and 1915, under the direction of the 
District Engineer of the Federal Geological Survey, more 
than seventy gaging stations were established along 
the Sevier River and its tributaries, and Annual Reports 
were made, covering these measurements by the Engi-
neer. Two of these gaging stations have special signi-
ficance in relation to the present action. The first is the 
Hatch Gaging Station which is situated at the town of 
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Hatch in Garfield County and with the exception of the 
Hatch Town Corporation and John Yardley is above 
the diversion point of each of the respondents. The 
second is the gaging station near Kingston which is 
located on the south fork (we are only concerned with 
the south fork in this action) of the Sevier River and is 
below the diversions of all the respondents. The water 
passing the Kingston Gaging Station represents the 
'vater from the south fork of the Sevier River received 
by the appellants. (Defs. Ex. 1) 
The Cox Decree 
The case of Richlands Irrigation Company vs. West 
l"iew Irrigation Company, et al., was a general adjudica-
tion of the waters of the Sevier River and finally resulted 
in publication of the Cox Decree in 1936. The general 
adjudication decree was a stipulated decree and no 
appeal was taken therefrom although it is referred to in 
a number of other cases. The case was filed in 1916, 
and on March 1st of that year, the DisJrict Court of the 
Fifth Judical District in Millard County appointed a 
Water Commissioner to direct the investigational work 
in connection with the general adjudication of all the 
water rights of the River and its tributaries. All matters 
pertaining to the work being performed by the Water 
Commissioner ".,.ere in 1920 reliquished by the court to 
the State Engineer, who, under the provisions of 
Chapter 67, Session Laws of Utah-1919, was required to 
make a Proposed Determination of all the rights to the 
use of the water from the Sevier River system. (Def~. 
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~X. 65, Pages 67-68) Pur~~ant_ .to thi~ relinquis~men~, 
~eorge :M:. Bacon, ihe State Eiigine~r, com~leted. in 
~925 iiis Pro:Po,sed :Dete~ni.l.iiat~on ,o£_ ~he j ~at~r. rights 
on the Se~!er River system and early in ~~2? filed this 
compiia ttori with the bistric~ court <?£ ~he Fi~th Judicial 
Pfstrict in M!tlard d~~nty. (Defs. Ex. 52) This exha~s­
tive do~uinent Is como:rily known as ''Bacon's Bibie'' and 
~ , ' .-·.. ' } i . . ' . ' . :- . . ' - ; ' : . ; Is ·largely the basis on which the stipulated Cox Decree 
--:. \·: '-· -:) -- ·• 5 -
was entered. 
The General Adjudication Decree ~ape by J udg~ 
Cox November 30, 1936, divid~d the .right to the use of 
tlie waters of the river irito two main classes: First, 
primary or direct flow rights, arid second' storage rights. 
It also divided such rights i~to defiliite specified perioas 
of time. In general th-e di~ect flow or primary rights 
exist during the irrigation sea-son, that is from April 
lst to September 30th of each year, and the storage 
rights exist from October 1st to September 30th follow-
ing. While storage rights exist throughout the twelve-
month period, actual storage largely takes place from 
October 1st to March 1st. The Cox Decree gives to the 
Piute Reservoir and the Sevier Bridge Reservoir all 
of the water of the river :riot specifically awarded to the 
direct flow rights. At page i85, the dec~ee provides : 
( _ ''.IT IS FURTHER . ORDERED, AP-
JUDGED and DECREED that the Piute Reser-
voir, and Irrigatio~ Company .... (and) the 
owners of the S~VIer Bridge Reservoir are the 
owners of the right to store and use all of the 
waters yielded by the said Sevier River for satis-
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fying ,their rights under .(storage applications 
made from 1902 to 19i2.) '' 
(The Cox Decree is a printed black volume and is 
entitled ''Decree adjudicating the Sevier. River Sys-
te~,; ~nd 'Ya~ introd~ced in evide~ce ~~ t:he p~·e-trial 
hearmg, and does not have an exhibit number.) 
The storage in the two reservoirs is made concul.·-
rently with Sevier Bridge receiving the first 89,280 acre 
feet, the Piute Reservoir receiving the next 40,000 acre 
feet. The next 32;000 acre feet are divided 75% to Sevier 
Bridge, 25% to Piute; Sevi,er Bridge receives the next 
i3,720 feet; the next 75,000 acre feet a~e divided 75% 
to Sevier Bridge and 25% to Piute, and then the decree 
provides : ''All otn-er or t1lrther ibafer available shall 
be allocated 85% to Sevter Bridge Re~eriJoir and .15% 
- ' ' ; -l - ~- ·. • .- • ~ .•. • '- • ~ • ~ ._ • .•. ~ :·" .~--~- ~ • ~:.;. . ·.... { 
to the Piute Reservotr." (Cox Decree, Page 186) 
For the irrigation of th.e lands j_n Panguitch Valley, 
the Cox Decree awarded a tota1 of l24.85 second feet 
.II ':' •,::.. I 1 
of primary water, 19.16 seco:nd feet of second cl~ss water 
and 37.50 second feet of third class water, all with 
periods "of use from March 15th .···to November 15th . of 
each year. The Decree awarp.ed 44 secpnd ~eet of winter 
water for use from :November 15th to M~rch 15th In 
proportion to the primary rights (Cox Decree, Page ·9, 
10 and 11). 
For use of the lands in Circle Valley, the Court 
awarded 95.24 second feet of primary water, 32.50 sec-
ond feet of secondary rights and 28.61 second feet of 
third class rights with the period of use for all these 
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rights from Aprillst to November 15th. The Cox Decree 
also provides Circle Valley users with 30 second feet of 
winter water with the ·period of use from November 15th 
to Aprillst (Cox Decree, Pages 8, 9). 
In a similar manner, the Cox Decree sets forth the 
primary, direct flow rights of all the appellant canal 
companies in Sevier~ Sanpete, Juab and Millard Coun-
ties. Each ·water right is defined in terms of qual·ity 
(first, second or third class right, depending_ on the flow 
of the river) quantity (amount that can· be diverted and 
time (specified period of use). 
Judge Jones in Finding No. 12 in the case now be-
-.~ 
fore this Court states: · 
"That during the months of July, August 
and September the. plaintiffs and applicants have 
not been able to satisfy their primary rights from 
the flow of the river, and during July, August 
and September, when irrigation is of the most 
importance to applicants, the water available 
approximates only a fraction of the primary 
rights ; . . . " (Italics ours) 
The fact of the matter is tha_t over the sixteen-year 
period 1935 to 1950 inclusive, there was water available 
to satisfy the primary rights in Panguitch Valley in full 
for each month of the year for 10 years. Primary rights 
were satisfied 95% for 3 years and 90% for 2 years for a 
16-year average of 97.5%. For that period, the second 
and third class rights were also satisfied for an average 
of 45 days of each year. For this same period Circle 
Valley primary rights have been satisfied on an average 
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of s2.4%. for the irrigation season. Sevier Valley pri-
..... "". ,. ,. '- ~ - ' ... "' . . ! ~ ' . ., ' 'l> 
mary rights ( embr~cing appellants) have only received 
57.5% of their _decreed __ water during this same span of 
years. (River Corhniissiorlef's 1950 Report-Defs. Ex. 4, 
Page 15). It c~n be seen by these figures that the Sevier 
River is greatly over-appropriatedJ aJ!.d that every drop 
of water has been beneficially used ahd reused. The pai·-
ties stipulated at the beginnihg of trial that many appli-
cations to appropriate water fi~ed since the Cox Decree 
was entered have been r~jected by the State Engineer 
without any hearing of any kind (R. 15). It is a well-
]plown fact that the river is· over-appropriated. (See 
figure 20, page 155 of Def"s. Ex~ 54) 
During the twenty-y¢ar period from Marchi; i916 
to November 30, 1936, the State Engineer, with more. 
than seven hundred parth~s to the action, their attorneys; 
engineers, economists and adVl.sors, worked almost con-
tirluously to brmg about a _decree which ~ould flrlally 
adjudicate, determine ahd settle all rights to the use of 
all of the Sevier River arid its tributaries. Th~ re-
spondents and their predecessors wer~ participants in 
this general adjudication whicH resulted in the box 
Decree and the Decree was inade with full knowledge that 
the tights granted therel.n would be limited by the geo-
graphic and climatic conditions which Prevail~d hi the 
areas where the waters were to be used. 
~ . 
Since the entry of the Cox Decree, several legal 
actions have been instituted, but these have been chiefly 
for an interpretation of the provisions of the Cox Decree. 
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The present action is the first case which seeks to ma-
terially change the operation and distribution of sub-
stantial rights, as awarded Uf!Uler this Decree. 
CHANGES PROPOSED IN 
RESPONDENTS' APPLICATIONS 
Since the entry- of the Cox Decree in 1936 the waters 
of the Sevier River have been administered by two river 
commissioners designated by the State Engineer, one 
of the commissioners (Mr. Ogden) being located at 
Richfield, Utah, and the other (Mr. Cole) at Delta, Utah. 
These commissioners have through a system of automatic 
measuring devices · (called clocks) installed at certain 
gaging stations, kept accurate records of the flow of the 
river and the quantities of water diverted from the river 
into the canals. The Annual Reports of these measure-. 
ments by the Sevier River Commissioners constitute 
Defendants' Exhibits 4 and 13 to 17, inclusive. 
Originally, there was a storage right for the Hatch 
Town Reservoir. This right was acquired by the State 
of Utah through the State Land Board. The State 
also acquired 5000 acres of land to be irrigated under the 
project. The Hatc4 Town Dam washed out in 1914. The 
State abandoned the water right and no attempt was 
made to re-build the dam. In 1949 ~orne of respondents 
purchased the 5000 acres of land from the State, as 
vvell as the land comprising the old Hatch Town Reser-
voir. Since the early 1860's, the respondents have taken 
\Vaters from the direct flow of the Sevier River into their 
canals and have used the sa1ne during the irrigation sea-
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son on their lands situated adjacent to the Sevier River. 
For more than 75 years respondents have claimed no 
storage rights. They now seek, under the guise of change 
applications, to acquire a storage right for winter flo'v 
waters for which they have heretofore, for more than 
75 years had no need and have made but a·limited use, 
permitting said winter waters for the most part to 
flow down the natural channel of the Sevier River past 
their last diversion point, (and until appropriated and 
impounded by the Reservoir Companies) into the old 
Sevier Lake where it was entirely wasted. The lands 
of respondents are located in Panguitch and Circle 
Valleys. The elevation of Panguitch is 6670 feet and at 
Circleville 5624 feet. The winters are extremely severe 
and at Panguitch it frequently freezes every month of 
the year. (Defs. Ex. 7, 57, 58 and 59) The average date 
of the last killing frost at Panguitch is June 21, and the 
average date of the first killing frost in the fall is Sep-
tember 7. The average growing seas·on is only 78 days. 
(Defs. Ex. 54, Page 65) 
The applications are simply attempts on the part 
of respondents, under the label of change applications, to 
appropriate water for use on the 5000 acres of new lands 
which they acquired from the State of Utah, and to ap-
propriate by means of storage of winter waters an 
additional supply for the irrigation of lands for which 
they now have an adequate summer direct flow right. 
We direct this Court's attention to appellants' ex-
hibit No. 53, which exhibit includes photostatic copies of 
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the water users; clain1s filed 1n the general adjudicat~oii 
' ' ' . . - t .. '. 
proceedings by all of the respondents. These claims were 
made under oath and at a tinie when all of the respond-
' : . . 
ertts had no reason or interest ift making a claiiri for 
water irt excess of their normal and beneficial use. 
Paragraph 9, subdivision (L) on page 3 of each 
water users claim requires an answer to this question: 
Do yo'lf_ ~~e water for irrigation outside of the grawin!) 
s~ason? Ten of the respondents stated: "n? use in non-
irrigation season.'' Others used terms as follows: One 
month in fall; early fall watering; very little some se~ 
sons; fall plowing; March 1st to Nov. 15th; refe.r to 
,, -
Morse decree; stockwatering. 
Paragraph 6, subdivision (b) oh page one of the 
wftter users claifu requires art afiswer to this qliestioh: 
''Annual period of use''' With one or two exceptions 
the appellants limited their annual period of lise to 
dates rtiiining from ahout March 15th to November 15th. 
A few claim.ed a use from about March 1st to Notember 
30th. 
The applications for permanent change of place of 
use filed .by respondents with the State Engineer all 
....... stated that the respondents had fully used their winter 
water rights as decreed to them by the Cox Decree. The 
state Enginee·r di'd not rule upon this avennent but 
' . ' 
rejected the applications on the ground that they sought 
an enlargement of present rights and would impair 
vestetl tights if approved. 
On appeal to the District Court, the appellants 
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CQ}lte~de4 t~at $e responqe11ts had not ~~q~ fpl~ us~ 
of t~ei~ deere~~ ~nter w~t~r; t~at it h~~ p~~~ respon4~ 
~nts' :pract~~e to take ~u~~ ~es~ t~~P the 7 4 cubi~ ~ecoJld 
~eet of 'vinter 'v~ter aw~rdeq ~~ tne Cox Decree i:p.~o 
th~ir c~n~ls, and 9ut ~f th~ ~mq~~ts that ll~4 been 
diy~~ted m~ch had "!leen retqrne<f ·directly to the river 
thr~~~~ ~h~ 'f~ste\yays. ~ppe1la:.~t~' exh~Plt~ n~mb.er~d 
19 to 31 inclusive a!e gr~p:P.s show~ng the 'rint~r · wate:r 
diverted by respondents from 1945 to 1951 into respond-
ept~ various ca~als as compared to the amounts of 
wate! avai~~ble. ~~ppellants' exhibit 32 is a summary 
of t#~ n~n~-use i!l Pa~guitch V ~lley and Circle Valley by 
~ll of resp9:ndent ~p~l cpmpa~i~s. These figures are 
pas~d on the me~~urement~ perspnally made by Leland 
C. O~ll~ste~ f9r t:P.~ ye~r~ indicated. Mr. Callister dif-
fereq by l.~l% ~s compared tp th~ data compiled by the 
Riye:r Co!llillissiq~e:r. (~. ()15) r.fllis sulllmary (defend-
~:pt~' e~hipit ~2) s4ow~ that i:p. rn~:Q.Y winter months the 
:r~~ponqept c~na.l companies qiy~rted no water whatso-
ever for winter use. The overall effect of these com-
• . .> ~ ,· ~ .. • • • • • • ·: / 
pil~t~o11s show th~t the respq~d~:pts h~d seldom used 
~s rq~ch as OJle-third qf tl,leir cl~imed winte:r water rights. 
However, nu~e:rous ind~viq:qal respa,ndent~ testified that 
~ey ha4 m;;tde fu~l ~se of their winter water, that the 
measurem~~t~ takf3n }>y th~ Riv~r Commissioner and by 
Mr. Cal!ister were inacc~rate, and t~at there had been 
no forfeit~re of winter wate:r or RJ!.Y portion thereof . 
.1\~tho~gh tn~ t~i~l cour~ ~tateq time and time agai~ 
th~t it would not and coulq not q~term~:qe any iss11e of 
forfeitur~ o:r :non-"Q~er ill tne~e pro~~ngs, it did in fact 
'· r ' ,· ~ :', •] f · · . • 
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make a specific finding on this point (Finding No. 11). 
The court lacked jurisdiction .to make such a finding but 
for purpose of argument this highly disputed matter 
may be taken in accordance with the respondents' evid-
ence-that is to say that during the winter months when 
the ground was frozen the respondents have diverted 
their entire decreed winter water right into their canals 
and used the same upon their lands. 
The Climatological Data compiled by the U. 8. 
Department of Commerce shows that in the Pa~guitch 
area for January, 1949 the average maximum tempera-
ture vvas 28°, the average minimum was 2 degrees below 
zero. In February the average maximum was 34°, the 
average minimum was -1 o. · The diversion of waters in 
the wintertime into the respondents canals would result 
in those canals freezing solid and the waters which 
flowed upon the land would result in the formation of 
sheets of ice and the direct return of the water to the 
river. As a result, the waters 6f the Sevier River which 
have been applied to lands in Panguitch and Circle 
Valleys have, of necessity, quickly flowed back to the 
river and thence into the Piute Reservoir where they 
have been stored in accordance with the Cox Decree and 
used by the parties having storage rights therein. 
A great number of exhibits were introduced to 
illustrate much technical data bearing upon the question 
of whether appellants' vested rights would be impaired 
if the applications were approved. While many of these 
exhibits do not require detailed study by this court 
' 
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plaintiff's exhibit G is immediateiy hereafter reproduced 
in full as the facts shown by such exhibit will be referred 
to several times in this brief. The exhibit shows the aver-
age flow of the river past the Hatch and Kingston 
Gaging Stations for each month of the ten-year period 
1940 to 1949, inclusive. The measurements at these sta-
tions show that during the winter months (October, No-
vember, December, January, February, March and 
April) the flow of the river at Kingston greatly exceeds 
the flow at Hatch, and during the months of May the 
flow at Hatch generally exceeds the flow at Kingston. 
During the months of June, July, August and Septem-
·ber, the flow at Hatch always greatly exceeds the flow 
at Kingston. The diminished flow at Kingston coin-
cides with the period of heavy irrigation in the Panguitch 
and Circleville areas and the period of increased flow at 
Kingston coincides with the period of decreased irriga-
tion in the Circleville and Panguitch areas. Besides re-
flecting the large amount of water that is consumed in 
irrigating respondents' lands, the figures illustrate the 
great variation in the flow of the river !rom month to 
month and from year_ to year. Nature does not furnish 
a steady supply of water and thus the amount received 
to fulfill the many users' rights varies constantly. 
EXHIBIT ''G'' 
(This exhibit shows the flow at the Hatch and 
Kingston Gaging Stations in cubic second feet for the 
month and years indicated as follows:) 
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~ .. 
MONTHLY MEAN SECOND FEE~ 
.;~ - -~ t1' ' 
JANUaRY 
.· 'c . - .. - -~ 
Hauh 







1947 -~----~--- 51.7 
1948.......... ;~4.0 
1949.......... 50.9 
M~an: ~-----~; ~ &l.{~ 
APRIL 
~atch 




i944 .. ________ iio.o 
1945 .......... l04.Q 
l94~------···- l~~-0 
194 7 ·r-·-····-- 136.0 
19~8---------- 128.0 
1~4~---------- }51.p_ 
,, I .J. . • 
1\;re~n : ...... 143.5 
+ ·. \ ("'\ 
JULY 
llatch 
19~0.......... ..5'7 .5' 
1941 .......... 214.0 
1942---------- 152.0 
i943.......... . 78.3 
1944 .... ~--~-- 148.0 
1945 .......... 111.0 
1946.......... 57.8 
1947 .......... 102.0 
1~48.......... 77.~ 
1949 .......... 151.0 
Mean: ______ 114.9 
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~. 
MONTHLY MEAN SECOND FEET 
. ~ . 
( CONTI~U:ED) : .. 
OCTOBER ~oy~~~~~ DECEMBE!l. 
·-
\ ~.' .... <!- " • ., • 
Batch Kingston Hatch Kingston Hatch Kingston 
1939 __________ 78.6. 14Q.O. 66.7 126 £ 62.6 129 
1940__________ 6P.2 127.0 54.5 123 48.4. 125 i94i__________ 122.6 199.0 106.0 97.9 ,1,' 198 195 
1942 __________ 192.8 119.0 
~ ~ ; 
·st.3 167 76.1 168 
1943 __________ 7~.6 108.0 67.3 140 ()9.3 146 
i 944 ..... ----- 82.7 totto 82.9 152 65.3 i39 1945 __________ 84.7 i44.9 '11.0 150 58.3 142 l946 __________ 73.0 113.P ~.~-7 152 58.9 13.9, i947·----~--- 90.6 150 70.4 . '· 69.8 67.7 144 i948 __________ 5~.3 46.7 61.3 119 54.8 103 
Mean : ______ 79.87 119.6 73.24 147.7 66.2 143:0 
Twenty of the respondents seek by their applications 
to build a new reservoir on the same site where the old 
' ,;; ' '-· ·, 
~~t~h {pwn ~~~ w~shed out in 1914. They propose to 
store what they claim as direct flow rights in the~ winter 
•• 4 • 
and ~arly spr~ng ~~asons and use th~se w.at~rs in the 
' ~ '• .. . ~. ,' ' ' 
summer irrigation season. Thes~ t'Y~~t~ appl~c~tio~s 
state on their faces that the op~:r$ltiou W.ill be car.ried 
on as follows: 
"Water will be stored when not needed, and 
when needed the water will be :run tb:rq11gb ·tb.~ 
reservoir. T·his is in order to improve the use of 
the wat~I?, conserving it when 'YI:?t n.:e,~detJ: fg! 
use in 1!19~~ critical ~~~sons of the ye~r." (E~-
phasis added, Plaintiff's Ex. A) ··. · 
These respondents are very frank in this statement 
' ~ ~ ~ • ..... ~,. 1' ,. 
in their applic~~i9~s. N am~~y, t~a~ t~e~ ~ee~ to sto~~ 
water for which they have had no _need. This presents 
the ~hief point of controversy in these cases. Respond-
ents now seek to store the water for which tlley have had 
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no need, and particularly the winter water which they 
have not heretofore used in any substantial amount and 
for which they largely made no claim of use and which 
has, for more than 80 years last past, been permitted 
to flow down the natural channel of the Sevier River 
unrestricted, and which has been appropriated by and 
used to make up the water rights of the appellants; 
particula'rly the storage rights of the owners of the 
Piute Reservoir and the Sevier Bridge Reservoir. The 
twenty cases which fall within this category are as fol-
lows : ( Pls. Ex. A) 
PANGUITCH VALLEY 
Application Acreage Pres-PLAINTIFF Case No. No. ently Irrigated 
East Panguitch 
Irrigation Company __________ 1472 a-2329 1260.2 
Alvin D. Wilson, Lindeau 
Foremaster and Mrs. Leah 
Wilson, Administratrix 
of the estate of Eli D. 
Wilson, Deceased ---------------- 1473 a-2394 276 
Angus A. Barton & 
Osborne Henrie ----------------.-- 1474 a-2334 113 
M. V. Hatch __________________________ 1481 a-2396 444.2 
James L. Hatch ____________________ 1482 a-2395 222.1 
Rex Whittaker -------------------- 1483 a-2382 146.9 
Bear Creek Irrigation 
Company ------------------------------ 1484 a-2381 293.5 
John M. Perkins, 
Marshall Ditch 
------------------
1486 a-2376 425.1 
East Bench Irrigation 
Company ------------------··---------- 1487 a-2328 750.6 
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Case No. No. entl:r Irrigated 
Long Canal Company __________ 1490 a-2333 1709.9 
McEwen Ditch Company ____ 1491 a-2332 950.1 
Mayo Riggs ------------------------ 1492 a-2331 45.0 
Barton,· LeFevre, Tebbs 
Ditch Company, Inc. __________ 1493 a-2330 419.3 
Total Acres________________ 6852.39 
Hatch Town Irriga-
tion Company -------------------- 1480 a-2407 1012.9 
(Located above the Hatch measuring station, the water is 
diverted directly from Mammoth Creek). 
John A. Yardley______________________ 1485 a-2378 500.0 
(Located above the Hatch measuring station, the water is 
diverted directly out of Mammoth and Assay Creeks). 
Total Acres________________ 1512.9 
CIRCLE VALLEY 
Thompson Ditch ---------------- 1475 a-2379 505.0 
Circleville Irrigation 
Company -------------------- __________ 1476 a~2377 4225.4 
Parker Brothers, M. 
Park and Eli Parker---------- 1477 a-2374 74.4 
Loss (Lost) Creek 
Irrigation Company ---------- 1478 a-2·375 858.4 
Junction Middle 
Ditch Company ------------------ 1479 a-2408 372.3 
Total Acres________________ 6034.15 
Three of the respondents have filed applications 
in 'vhich they seek to use their present direct flow rights 
in the irrigation season for the irrigating of 5,000 acres 
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~· , 
of entirely new land~ which is situated under the old 
al1andoned State dan~l. They state in their appli~_atio~s 
that the purpose of the change is as follows : 
' ' !' 
''Applicant intends to ir~igate said lands 
under this appli~tion, ( 5,ooq ft,~r~~ 9f ~~W l~~qs) 
together w.ith others to be made. her~after, for the 
purpose of producing pasture feeds and other 
crops, and applicant desires the right to change 
water at various times througho1:1t the -ye~r t~ 
use in this manner as applicant deems advisable.'' {Pis. Ex~· ::B;· a-2371 f H · .- · \f' -r· .. 1 '' · 
These applicants seek to use the water for the irri-
gation of 5,000 acres of additional lands not heretofore 
irrigat~~ l>Y a~y Qf ~h~ :re~:p.9~dent~. They have al~9 
filed applications, as her~inabove shown, to store the 
. ·: t· ' •' 
winter and early spring flow, which they do not need and 
which they have heretofore made no claim to the right 
to use, for irrigation purposes. Thus, they would use 
the,it; present S'IJ!Pply_ for th~ irrigation of the 5 ,OOf!. a.cr~f 
o,f new land and use the stored water fPr f~~ irrigatio~t 
of their present lands. This would allow these three 
respondents to ~ouble their s~pply of water, and if the 
. . -;.... . . .' . ' 
applications are approved, would in effect permit th~~~ 
re&P.P.I!dents, under a guise of change application, to 
a:p.:pro~riate suffi~ient water to irrigate 5,000 acres of 
additional land. The applications that fall within this 
. , ' . 
class are as follows: 
. "'f". ~ • 
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East Bench Irri-
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nation and Application. 
PlaiR tiffs' P~:\!nt~•· 






~ . ..,. 
1709.9 2200 
126o.2 ; ,~,'.,...( 1900 
T'otal Acres·-------------~- 3720.7 5100 
The plaintiffs' claims of acreage are iliconsistent 
and un~_eli~bl~ as ~:h_own by;. tlie following itemization 
o(. ~heir ;_claims'! _ColQ.Inn ~ A represe,Iits the a·creage 
cla~med py 1 eac4 .. of __ th~. foregoing plaintiffs in their 
water users' claim filed before . the Proposed D~termi­
nation was formulated in _1926 (Defend~nt~'. E~hibi.t 
5g). Coluinrl B represents the acreage listed. in the 
Proposed Determination compiled by George M. Bacon; 
the then State ~1lg!neer, ,a:fter ~.akip.g -~ sur;vey; of the 
piaintiffs' irrigated Hinds t:Peferidants' E~ibit 5~, 
Pages 15 and 16). Column C repres~nts the acreage 
n_ow claimed to be under irrigation by the plaintiffs in 
their change app~ications (Plaintiffs' Exhibit B). The 
court w~l note th~~·} in th~ir change (applications as 
set forth in plafutiffs' Exhibit A (applications NOS. 
2~28, 2.333, aP.:!-1 . 2329) . the three above-listed companies 
have stated their irrigated acreage to be the s~me as 
that shown in Bacon's Proposed Detenhination (Column 
B abo"Ve) w-hich figures are consideriibly lower than 
the acreage lis.ted in the change applica tiohs seeking 
to irrigate 5;000 additional acres of land (Column C 
above). 
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It is the position of the respondents that the Cox 
Decree awarded to them fixed quantities of water not 
limited by time or place of use or manner of use and 
as their counsel stated "such water may be taken in a 
bucket and dumped into the Colorado River'' if respond-
ents so decided. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS 
Following are set forth the points upon which the 
appellants rely for a reversal of the decree entered by 
the trial court : 
1. The trial court erred in finding in paragraph 6 
of the Findings, 
''That ~he plaintiffs (applicants) are entitled, 
respectively, to the use of water of the Sevier 
River in the amounts and for the periods as set 
forth in the 'Cox Decree' of 1936. '' 
in that the evidence is insufficient to support such find-
ing, and such finding is contrary to the evidence. 
This is assigned as error for the further reason 
that the trial court ought not determine the rights of 
the parties as of now, but should have limited this 
finding to the fact that the plaintiffs were awarded cer-
tain rights by and as set forth in the Cox Decree. 
2. The trial court erred in finding in paragraph 
7 of the Findings, 
"That the applicants and plaintiffs herein 
at the present time divert all of the waters 
which they were decreed from the Sevier River 
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and its tributaries by means of diversion dams 
located in the natural stream beds.'' 
in that the evidence is insufficient to support such find-
ings and such finding is contrary to the evidence. 
3. The trial court erred in finding in paragraph 
16 of the Findings, 
''That the construction of the reservoir near 
Hatch, as proposed by applicants, is. physically 
and economically feasible, and that applicants 
have. the financial ability to complete the pro-
posed works.'' 
in that the evidence is insufficient to support such find-
Ings. 
4. The trial court erred in making its findings No. 
17, in that the matters therein set forth are not prop-
erly issues in this cause. 
5. The trial court erred In finding in paragraph 
19 of the Findings that the State Engineer and the 
Water Commissioners should not be charged with the 
responsibility of seeing to it that these appellants get 
their full water rights but that such duty be charged 
to the plaintiffs. 
6. The trial court erred in making its finding No. 
20 in that the evidence is insufficient to support such 
finding. 
7. The trial court erred in making its finding No. 
21 in that the evidence is insufficient to support such 
finding. 
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8. The triiil court erred ill !liiding in paragraph 
23 of the Findings, 
"That the 'on call; system, on conditions, ts 
fea.~ibl~ i~. th.e present. ~ase. '' 
in that flie evidence is insufficieh t to support such 
finding and that such finding is contrary to the evidence. 
9. The trial cotirt erred in ii6t making any findings 
concerning the returii flo_w ' of w~ter used on the pro-
posed new -til~rea.ge of 5,ooo actes to tie brought under 
cultivation, and particularly in not finding tlHit in irri-
gating such new acreage th~re would be far less return 
flow for the benefit of these appellants than the use 
of water on the a~reage irrigated at the time of and 
. - . . -. .. t. 
since the entry of the Cox Decr~e. 
10. The court erred in making its Conclusions of 
Law in determining· that the applications in question 
ought to be conditionally approved, aiid in ordering the 
State Engineer to approve such applications (Coiichi-
sions of Law NOS. 1; 2, 3, 4, 5, and 9). 
11. The court erred in making its Conclusions of 
Law No. 6 in concluding (a) that the present subsisting 
water rights of all the pa!ties are set forth in the 
"Cox'' decree, and (b) that no party has lost or for-
feited his or its water by abandonment or nonuser. 
This conclusion is assigned as error for the reason 
that the court in the instant proceedings should not 
determine the present rights of the parties, and should 
not determine the issue of abandonment or non-user. 
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12. That the court erred in making its Conclusion 
of La"v No. 7 in approving each of the applications on 
the conditions therein set forth. 
This conclusion is assigned as error for the rea-
son that there is no evidence in the record to justify 
the trial court in imposing the co~ditions therein set 
forth or in determining that such conditions will pro-
tect the vested water rights of these appellants. 
13. That the court ered in not making its Con-
clusion of Law to the effect that the approval of the 
applications would impair the vested rights of these 
appellants. 
14. That the trial court erred in rendering its judg-
ment and decree in favor of the plaintiffs and respond-
ents in that: 
a. It re-writes and re-determines portions of the 
Cox Decree wherein the water rights of these appel-
lants are specifically determined and adjudicated. 
b. By the readjudication of the rights of these 
appellants, such rights are restricted, lessened, and 
impaired, and accrue to the appellants in a_ manner 
different from that originally awarded as to time and 
amount of return flow, time when and amount of water 
that is available for storage and apportionment as 
among themselves of water received from time to time 
for storage. 
c. It permits respondents to enlarge upon their 
previously adjudicated rights by extending the use 
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thereof for the irrigation of an additional five thousand 
acres of land, and at a place where there will be a 
lesser return flow for the benefit of appellants. 
d. It permits respondents to enlarge upon their 
previously adjudicated rights by using their winter 
rights which could only be used in a limited way and to a 
limited degree, at a different time of the year when 
the use of such water will impair the vested rights of 
these appellants. 
e. It permits respondents to use the water during 
summer months when the return flow for appellants' 
benefit will be less than as used when the Cox Decree 
awarded the respondents and appellants their respec-
tive rights. 
f. It permits respondents to use the water during 
the summer months when the time of return flow for 
storage is changed so that the respective storage rights 
of various appellants will be changed, and so that 
water which now goes to storage will be used by pri-
mary users as a direct flow right. 
g. It permits respondents to convert a direct flow 
winter use and right to a storage right for summer 
use, which results in an impairment of the vested rights 
of appellants. 
h. It requires and permits the respondents to en-
force conditions of river administration in the deliverv 
•' 
of water covering the appellants' rights, which under 
the law is made the duty of the State Engineer and 
his River Commissioners. 
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i. It sets out an arbitrary formula for determin-
ing whether appellants will receive the water to which 
they are entitled, and which formula provides for arbi-
trary computations as to volumes and periods of time. 
j. It fails to provide that the change applications 
shall not impair the vested rights of the appellants and 
does not provide that the approvals are conditioned and 
made subject to the vested rights of the appellants. 
k. It will result in an impairment of the vested 
rights of these appellants. 
I. Paragraph 6 of the decree gives to the Water 
Commissioners the right to change the conditions therein 
set forth, without any limitations and solely within the 
discretion of said Water Commissioners without regard 
to the rights of lower users. 
m. The decree is contrary to the findings and is 
not supported by the findings. 
n. The decree is contrary to law. 
15. The trial court erred in failing to find the issues 
in favor of appellants, and in failing to determine that 
the decision of the State Engineer in disapproving the 
applications should be sustained. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT 1 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECREE UNLAWFULLY TAKES 
WATER FROM APPELLANTS AND GIVES THAT WATER 
TO RESPONDENTS FOR USE AND CONSUMPTION UPON 
5,000 ACRES OF RAW SAGEBRUSH LANDS RECENTLY 
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ACQUIRED BY_THE RESPONDENTS AND LOCATED FAR 
FROM THE SEVIER RIVER. 
POINT 2 
THE DECREE UNLAWFULLY PERMITS RESPOND-
ENTS TO CONVERT DIRECT FLOW RIGHTS INTO S~OR­
AGE RIGHTS. 
POINT 3 
THE DECREE IMPAIRS VESTED RIGHTS AS SHOWN 
BY: 
(A) DEFINITION AND DETERMINATION OF THE 
VESTED RIGHTS OF RESPONDENTS. 
(B) DEFINITION AND DETERMINATION OF THE 
VESTED RIGHTS OF RESPONDENTS . 
• 
(c) THE DECREE APPROVING THE APPLICATIONS 
ENLARGES THE VESTED RIGHTS OF RESPONDENTS AT 
THE EXPENSE AND IMPAIRMENT OF APPELLANTS' 
VESTED RIGHTS. 
POINT 4 
THE DECREE TAKES FROM THE STATE ENGINEER 
AND THE RIVER COMMISSIONERS THE ADMINISTRA-
TION OF THE RIVER ABOVE THE KINGSTON GAGING 
STATION AND UNLAWFULLY VESTS SUCH ADMINIS-
TRATION IN THE RESPONDENTS. 
POINT 5 
(A) THE DECREE IN EFFECT ABROGATES THE COX 
DECREE NOTWITHSTANDING THE PROCEEDINGS BE-
FORE THE TRIAL COURT WERE MERELY TO REVIEW 
THE STATE ENGINEER'S REJECTION OF RESPONDENTS' 
APPLICATIONS. 
(B) THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDIC-
TION TO MAKE ANY INTERPRETATION, CONSTRUCTION 
OR MODIFICATION OF THE COX DECREE AND THE 
COURT'S ACTION IN THIS RESPECT WAS UNLAWFUL 
AND VOID. UNDER THE GUISE OF REVIEWING THE 
ACTION OF THE STATE ENGINEER THE TRIAL COURT 
UNLAWFULLY ADJUDICATED WATER RIGHTS. 
POINT 6 
THE DECREE IS ARBITRARY AND UNCONSCION-
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ABLE AND THE FORMULA ADOPTED BY THE TRIAL 
COURT IS WITHOUT SUPPORT IN THE EVIDENCE. THE 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
DECREE ARE UNINTELLIGIBLE AND CONFLICTING 
AND IMPOSSIBLE OF PROPER CONSTRUCTION AND 
DETERMINATION. 
POINT 7 
THE DECREE IS ERRONEOUS IN THAT IT IS AD-
MINISTRATIVELY UNWORKABLE. 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 
POINT 1 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECREE UNLAWFULLY TAKES 
WATER FROM APPELLANTS AND GIVES THAT WATER 
TO RESPONDENTS FOR USE AND CONSUMPTION UPON 
5,000 ACRES OF RAW SAGEBRUSH LANDS RECENTLY 
ACQUIRED BY THE RESPONDENTS AND LOCATED FAR· 
FROM THE SEVIER RIVER. 
As noted above, there are three applications which 
have been separately approved in paragraph 2 of the 
trial court's judgment and decree, which propose to 
apply the waters to be stored in the IIatch Town Reser-
voir to 5,000 acres of raw sagebrush land. The appli-
cations are (plaintiffs' Exhibit B): 
Present Acre-
NAME OF APPLICANT Application No. age Irrigated 
East Panguitch Irrigation Co.________ a-2371 
East Bench Irrigation Co_______________ a-2372 




TotaL_______________ ·3720. 7 acres 
The newly acquired lands are to be irrigated in 
addition to the 3720.7 acres which these companies pres-
ently irrigate. This fantastic scheme would increase the 
irrigated acreage of these companies by 134%. In re-
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gard to the new 5,000 acres their applications as ap-
proved by the trial court would permit them ''to make 
exchwnge, at any time, of water owned by applicant as 
applicant shaU deem advisable." The irrigated acre-
age of respondents in the entire Panguitch and Circle 
Valleys is only approximately 14,000 acres, and now 
after more than 75 years of settlement and farming 
in the Sevier River Valley, these applicants blandly 
assert the right to cultivate this huge amount of addi-
tional land. This singular fact is sufficient to sustain 
the State Engineer's rejection of these applications 
and justify a reversal of the trial court's decree. On 
the basis of 10 acres to one Salt Lake City Block, the 
new lands of respondents would embrace an area com-
parable to 500 city blocks, that is from the Hotel Utah 
to 22nd South, thence East to 22nd East, thence 
North to South Temple extended and thence West to 
point of beginning. This court should judicially acknowl-
edge the fact that it is an impossible feat to somehow--
squeeze enough water out of a right which has served 
3720.7 acres to take care of 8720 acres without impair-
ment of vested rights of lower appropriators in the over-
appropriated Sevier River system. As stated in En-
larged Southside Irrigation Ditch Co. v. John's Flood 
Ditch Co. (Colo.), 183 P. 2d 552, 555: 
''In fact, the acreage under irrigation is the 
principal basis of measurement of the use of 
water in the adjudication of priorities and use 
on increased acreage of necessity is 'evidence 
although rebuttable, of increased use either i~ 
volume or time." (Italics added) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
35 
These 5000 acres are marked by the red crosses on 
plaintiffs' Exhibit T. They 1ie in 19 sections in 3 town-
ships along the east side of Panguitch Valley. As 
shown by plaintiffs' Exhibit T or more accurately by 
defendants' Exhibit 18 the new lands are from 2 to 
3 miles away from the river while the lands presently 
being irrigated by respondents lie within 1f2 mile of 
the river. Thus, waters being used under present con-
ditions :r;nust move a distance of approximately y2 mile 
to return to the river whereas the bulk of the waters 
applied to the new lands would have to seep from 
2 to 3 miles in order to return to the river and be re-
used by lower appropriators. (R. 216) 
More alarming is the fact that the distinguished 
expert for the plaintiff, (Dr. 0. W. Israelson), and the 
distinguished expert for the defendant, (B. F. Lof-
gren), agreed that the consumptive use of water on the 
new land, based on the average type of crop raised in 
Panguitch Valley would amount to 21 inches (Lofgren, 
R. 367, 417) or 22 inches of water (Israelson, Ex. W 
Chart 4). The use on the 5000 acres of 21 inches of 
water per acre would be equivalent to 9000 acre feet 
of water totally consumed. (R. 370) The net result 
would be that of the 13,000 acre feet which is proposed 
to be stored in the Hatch Town Reservoir, 1,000 acre 
feet would be lost through evaporation while the water 
was in storage (R. 369), 3,000 acre feet would be lost 
in transit through the 4 miles of canal, and 9000 acre 
feet would be applied and completely consumed on the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
36 
new land. Of the 3000 acre feet lost in the gravelly 
bed of the canal, but a fraction would seep to the strea1n 
bed and thus the only return flow to the river out of 
13,000 acre feet impounded at Hatch would be 800 or 
900 acre feet. (R. 370) 
Furthermore, there are a number of springs on 
the long slope on the east side of Panguitch Valley 
where the new 5000 acres of land are located (R. 371). 
These springs bear out the fact that a portion of the 
substrata underlying the 5000 acres are somewhat im-
pervious and are sloping away from the river. Other 
beds slope toward the river at a less degree than the 
surface. The water on its downward course of perco-
lation would strike these underlying beds and thereby 
be forced to the surface. Around the springs there are 
clumps of willows and grass which form good pastur-
age but prevents return flow to the river (R. 372). 
These spring waters have already been appropriated 
and any increased flow that might result from the 
waters applied to the new 5000 acres would inure to 
the benefit of these appropriators. The ultimate return 
flow to the river would be decreased further by this 
double use. 
The experts of both parties concurred in the 
amount of consumptive use. The distant location of 
the new lands from the river ·Can plainly be seen on 
the respective exhibits (plaintiffs' Exhibit T; defend-
ants' Exhibit 18). The trial court did not make any 
findings on this vital testimony, but ignored it, when 
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the only possible conclusion to be drawn therefrom is 
that if respondents irrigate this vast tract of additional 
land, there 'vould be practically no return flow. As 
the river system is now operated in an average year 
60% of the water applied to respondents' lands during 
the sunnner season returns to the river (R. 395). 
One of appellants' principal contentions on appeal 
is that this use of water on 5000 acres of new land, far 
removed from the river, clearly impairs their vested 
rights~ No extensive citation of_ case authorities is nec-
essary on this point, for the law is stated in the govern-
ing statute as follows: 
73-3-3 U. C. A. 1953 
''Any person entitled to the use of water may 
G.hange the place of diversion or use and may use 
the water for other purposes than those for which 
it was originally appropriated but no such change 
shall be made if it imp,airs any vested' right with-
out just compensation.'' (Emphasis added) 
POINT 2 
THE DECREE UNLAWFULLY PERMITS RESPOND-
ENTS TO CONVERT DIRECT FLOW RIGHTS INTO STOR-
AGE RIGHTS. 
In addition to the three applications to apply water 
to 5000 acres of new land, this case includes 20 other 
applications which seek to store winter and summer 
direct flow rights for subsequent use in June, July and 
August on the lands being presently irrigated. 
Appellants admit that respondents would be bene-
fitte·d if they were a!ble to store winter water which they 
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do not now use or consume for use during the growing 
season and particularly use it on 5000 acres of new 
land. Such an acquisition of additional water for sum-
mer use would be as beneficial as money in the bank. 
(See Finding No. 19) But the test is whether this can 
be done without taking the water of lower users. The 
evidence in this record conclusively indicates that it 
cannot be done. 
The total winter flow rights of all the Panguitch 
users equals 44 second feet for the period November 
15th to March 15th as determined by the Cox Decree. 
In Circle Valley the total winter flow rights from No-
vember 15th to April 1st equals 30 second feet. (R. 46) 
These amounts are direct flow rights. That is, when 
used they have always been diverted from the river 
directly into the canals and applied to the lands without 
being contained in. any reservoir or stored in any man-
ner. Such use has returned the water to the river for 
storage in the Piute Reservoir. 
The defendants' Exhibits numbers 38, 42 and 46 
are a group of photographs which show the amount of 
snow and the climatic conditions which prevail in the 
Panguitch area during these winter months. Exhibits 
numbered 57 and 58 are Climatalogical Data for Janu-
ary and February for the year 1949, compiled by the 
U.S. Department of Commerce. The exhibits show that 
in January the max'imwn temperature for Pan-
guitch was 39° and the minimum was -24°. The aver-
age maximum for the month was 28°, the average mini-
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mum was -2°. In February the maximum was 49°, 
the minimun1 -27°, the average maximum was 34°, the 
average minitnum was -1 o. In short, it was cold and 
the ground was frozen. Assuming for the sake of argu-
ment that respondents have in the past applied the 
entire 74 second feet of decreed winter water to their 
lands during the period November 15, to March 15, 
this water of ~ecessity would have flowed quickly over 
the frozen ground and returned to the river. The amount 
of evaporation would be very slight and the consump-
tive use or transpiration would equal zero. Practically 
the entire flow would return to the river and hence to 
the Piute Reservoir whe.re it would be stored to fill the 
storage rights- of appellant storage CO'·mpanies. Water 
which flows into Piute. Reservoir in the summer months 
normally does not flow in sufficient quantity to belong 
to the storage companies but goes to the primary direct 
flow users. 
The historical background as to how, when and 
why the storage companies acquired their rights is very 
important to an understanding of appellants' present 
contentions. By 1900, after more than 40 years of settle-
ment along the Sevier River, practically all of the 
lands that could be placed under cultivation by direct 
diversion from the river had been so accomplished. 
Notwithstanding these direct diversions there were still 
large quantities of water flowing into Sevier Lake where 
they were wasted. This fact prompted the formation 
of the reservoir companies and the building of the Piute 
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and Sevier Bridge Reservoirs. These reservoirs were 
built for the specific purpose of catching the unused 
winter flow and high spring runoff of the Sevier River. 
The reservoir companies took this water which no other 
user along the river could or would use and thousands 
of acres of fine agricultural lands in Sevier, Sanpete 
and Millard Counties were made productive. The com-
panies having storage rights in the Piute and Sevier 
Bridge Reservoirs acquire practically all of their water 
during the winter and early spring months. Water 
which passes the Kingston Gaging Station and reaches 
the Piute Reservoir during the summer irrigation sea-
son does not normally fulfill storage rights, but is 
permitted to flow on down the river where it is diverted 
by the various canal companies having direct flow sum-
mer riy.its. Some of these primary users are the appe]r 
lants, E ichfield Irrigation & Canal Co. ; Annabella Irri-
gation t ;o.; Elsinore Canal Co.; Brooklyn Canal Co.; 
Monroe Irrigation Co.; Wells Irrigation Co.; Joseph 
Irrigati\ 1n Company; Sevier -Valley Canal Co.; Ver-
million lrrigation Co. and Monroe South Bend Canal Co. 
Because the Cox Decree apportions storage rights be-
tween Piute and Sevier Bridge Reservoirs, the water 
rights of the five co_mpanies which own the Sevier Bridge 
would be prejudiced in the same manner as the Piute 
Reservoir and Irrigation Co. They are: Deseret Irri-
gation Co.; Melville Irrigation Co.; Delta Canal Com-
pany; (jentral Utah Water Co. and Abraham Irriga-
tion Co. Sevier Bridge and Piute Reservoirs are filled 
concuriently under the Cox Decree in the amounts as 
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stated at page 11 of this brief and if during their 
storagt! season, the 'vater is not permitted to flow into 
Piute ]leservoir in the amounts and at the same time as 
has be•~n the case under the Cox Decree, then appellants' 
storage rights will be diminished. From Panguitch to 
the Piute Reservoir is approximately 42 miles. From 
the last canal diversion of respondents in Circl~ Valley 
to the Piute Reservoir is approximately l:Y2 miles. 
Under present conditions the return flow from the 
application ofwinter water 'vould be almost immediate 
or within two or three days at the most. But the return 
flow from the newly proposed stored water will be 
delayed during the period of time that the water is 
stored at Hatch. Thus 'vinter water impounded in the 
Hatch Town Reservoir for use during the following 
summer vvould be taken directly from the appellants ns 
an absolute certainty. 
The judgment and decree entered by the trial court 
approving the respondents' scheme to hold back and 
store winter water, (which they do not now use Dl 
consume) and which they may then release during the 
irrigation season for use on 5000 acres of additional 
new land and/or for use on the presently irrigated lands 
cannot possibly operate without impairing the vested 
rights of these appellants. The storage companies are 
deprived of their water as surely as if the trial court 
ordered forthright that they give up and convey the 
waters to the respondents with the return flow inuring 
to the benefit of the primary users. 
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POINT 3 
THE DECREE IMP AIRS VESTED RIGHTS AS SHOWN 
BY: 
(A) DEFINITION AND DETERMINATION OF THE 
VESTED RIGHTS O'F RESPONDENTS. 
The fundamental inquiry in litigation involving a 
request to change the point of diversion and place and 
nature of use of irrigation waters so as not to impair 
vested rights is : Precisely what are the rights of both 
the applicant for the change and the protestants thereto? 
In the instant case the Cox Decree specifies a maxi-
mum amount of water which respondents are entitled 
to divert from the river into their canals and to apply 
onto their lands. Respondents testified that they diverted 
their decreed winter water into their canals and let it 
flow over their pastures in all seasons of the year, par-
ticularly November, December, January, February, 
March and April. During these winter months, the 
ground is frozen and the return flow of the waters to 
the river is practically complete. 
The right to use the waters at such time, in such 
man;ner and for such purpose is the limit and extent of 
resp-ondents' winter rights. 
For respondents' rights are defined in law as fol-
lows: 73-1-3, U. C. A. 1953 
''Beneficial use shall be the basis, the meas-
ure and the limit of all rights to the use of water 
in this state. (Emphasis added). 
This statutory provision is siruilarly expressed in the 
Cox Decree: 
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"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, AD-
JUDGED and DECREED that beneficial use 
shall be the basis, the measure and the limitation 
of all rights to the use of the waters of said 
Sevier River System herein determined.'' (Page 
2 of the Decree) 
" .. the rights herein decreed are subject to 
the condition that they are required and neces-
sary for beneficial uses, and such rights are sub-
ject to the limitations and conditions that the 
same are used for beneficial purposes, economic-
ally and without waste. Any water diverted from 
the said river and/ or its tributaries, not benefici-
ally used under the rights of the respective par-
ties to this decree shall be returned to the river 
by the most practical and direct route.'' (Page 
231) 
In Gunnison Irrig,ation Co. vs. Gu;nnison H. C. Co., 
52 Utah 347, 174 Pac. 852, the Supreme Court of Utah 
stated: 
''In short, the rights of a prior appropriator 
are measured and limited by the extent of his 
appropriation and app}ication to a beneficial 
use.'' 
And in referring to this same statutory provision, this 
court stated in Salt Lake City vs. Gardner, 39 Utah 
30, 114 Pac. 147: 
''The doctrine reflected in the foregoing 
statute has so often been declared to be the law 
with respect to the appropriation of water during 
the last 25 years that it has become elementary 
and is no longer questioned.'' · 
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This Court has previously held that an appropria-
tion of water is limited by time as well as by amount, 
and that an appropriator's right is limited by the sea-
sonal period during which he has used the same. We 
refer to the case of Hardy vs. Beaver ·Cownty Irriga-
tion Company, 65 Utah 28, 234 P. 524, at page 529 ( 4), 
and we quote : 
''It is elementary that an appropriation of 
water is limited by time as well as by amount; 
in other words, that an appropriator's right is 
limited by the quantity of water which he has 
beneficially used and the seasonal period during 
which he has used the same. (Quoting numerous 
cases from Western jurisdictions). And in the 
case at ·bar the respondents' appropriations must 
be limi£.ed to the amount of water they can use 
beneficially during the period of the year when 
they have actually been accustomed to use the 
same .... " 
The respondents have the right to apply their 
decreed water directly to their lands during the period 
of use stated in the Cox Decree and in the manner and 
for the purpose for U 1hich such water was decreed. But 
respondents have never utilized winter water for sum-
mer irrigation, and thus their rights are limited to the 
extent of past beneficial use to which they have put the 
water. 
This statutory provision is in effect a legislative 
mandate that no one in the State of Utah has any right 
to water, founded on a paper title. Rights to water are 
based on beneficial use. In the irrigation field there is 
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no. absolute oWnership of \Vater in this state; parties 
are only entitled to .obtain a use right. The trial court 
erroneously disregarded this fundamental concept, yet 
it has been expressed in the very latest decisions of 
this court. In U.S. A. vs. District Court, 238 P. 2d 
at Page 1134, :Jir. Justice Wade stated: 
''The right to the use of water, although a 
property right ,is very different from the owner-
ship of specific property which is subject . to 
possession, control and use as the owner sees 
fit. Such right does not involve the ownership 
of a- specific body of water but is only a right 
to use a given amount of the transitory waters 
of a stream or water source for a specified time, 
place and purpose, and a change in any of these 
might materially affect the rights of other users 
of the sam.e stream or source." (Emphasis added) 
And in the same case, Mr. Chief Justice Wolfe 
stated at 242 P. 2d Page 778: 
''The right to the use of water is very differ~ 
ent from the fee title to land, largely due to the 
very difference in the nature of the two sub-
stances. Real estate is fixed while water is fugi-
tive .... The basis, the measure and the limit of 
the right to use (water) was what could be used 
by each beneficially. What could not be used bene-
ficially was wasted and this could not be per-
mitted." 
Once the limit and extent of respondents' rights is 
defined and understood, this court can readily realize 
why the State Engineer stated in his letter rejecting 
the respondents' applications : 
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''It is the. opinion of the State Engineer 
that the proposed change constitutes an enlarge-
ment of a de~reed right, and would adversely 
affect existing rights.'' 
For here is a case in which the respondents for 17 
years since the Cox Decree ha.ve had a paper title to 
74 cubic second feet of winter water which if used at 
all has been applied on frozen ground and completely 
returned to the river. This manner of use and the 
benefit derived therefrom is the limit and extent of 
this wat~r right. To store this water for more bene-
ficial use in the summer on the same lands plus 5000 
additional acres is_ clearly an enlargement of the right, 
by statutory definition. 
(B) DEFINITION AND DETERMINATION OF THE 
VESTED RIGHTS OF APPELLANTS. 
Appellants' vested rights are determined by the 
same standards as those of respondents. It has been 
said several times in this brief that the Cox Decree 
provides at Page 185 that the Sevier Bridge and Piute 
Reservoirs : 
''are the owners of the right to store and use 
all of the waters yielded by the said Sevier River 
for satisfying their rig]lt under." .... (storage 
applications which appropriated all of the un-
appropriated waters of the 'river including un-
used return flow from the primary users). 
The Cox Decree reiterates this theory of what the 
storage rights consist: 
: ' .. · .. any and .all water in any way accumulated 
In said Reservoirs or otherwise, as water in eX<'ess 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
47 
of primary rights, as in this decree defined, shall 
be treated as storage water belonging to said 
Reservoirs under their filings, and shall be al-
located and divided as provided in this decree and 
shall be held, released, and otherwise admini-
stered in all respects as storage water under the 
provisions of this decree governing storage water 
accruing to the Piute Reservoir and the Sevier 
Bridge Reservoir under their respective filings.'' 
(Page 195) 
This language gives the entire residue of the Sevier 
River to the storage companies after the primary users 
have taken and used the water. The reasoning and 
philosophy of this decreed right is based on more than 
75 years of history and settlement along the Sevier 
River and the use of its waters. All the original direct 
diversions were primarily for summer use when irri-
gation required the precious water. Then from 1902 
to 1912 the. storage companies filed their applications 
listed at Page 185 of the Cox Decree to appropriate t;he 
river water then unappropriated. 
This meant that the storage companies received the 
winter flow that was not otherwise put to beneficial use, 
and also the spring excesses which were not diverted 
into the canals and consumed on the lands of the pri-
mary users. It should be remembered that although 
the water is decreed to the primary users in terms of 
cubic feet per second, this award means nothing more 
than the right to dip into the river to the extent of 
the beneficial use requirements for the irrigation of the 
lands to which the water was decreed. (R. 306) In 
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other words if during the month of July, a summer 
cloudburst would swell the river at a time when it was 
raining on the primary users' lands and therefore the 
river flow could not be put to beneficial use, the river 
water is not during that period of time decreed to the 
primary users. These excesses have not been allowed to 
go to waste. They have been captured in the reservoirs 
and become storage companies' water to use on their 
lands. The reservoirs were built to use what the primary 
rights did not use. 
Thus the storage companies, since they built their 
reservoirs have always had a vested right to this water. 
Necessarily this means that both the storage companie~ 
and the lower primary appropriators have a vested 
right in the continuation of the conditions and circum-
stances that produces such return flow. This is the 
lower users' vested right; to have the water continue 
to flow down to them as it has in the past. They have 
developed farms and built communities based on those 
vested rights. 
The appellants do not contend that respondents may 
not make improvements in the application of water 
upon their lands, but under the guise of making such 
changes the respondents should not be permitt~d to 
store waters for irrigation which they have never used 
for such purposes; to use it on lands where it hn~ 
never been used before or to prevent the water returnin<" 0 
to the main channel of the river at the ti1ne and in the 
quantities it has formerly returned. The appPllants 
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have no desire to prevent the respondents from using 
the waters of the Sevier River in the same manner, 
time and upon the same lands as the respondents ·have 
used such water in the last three decades, but the 
respondents do not have a latent right at their pleas-
ure to enlarge upon such use at the expens.e of the lo~er 
users. Without such rule there ·could be no permanent 
improvement or stability on the lower portions of a 
river system until lower users had idly awaited the 
fullest development in the upper regions of the river 
system. 
This court's decision in La.sson vs. Seely (Utah, 
1951), 238 P. 2d 418 held that a water user did not 
have to waste water while it "\vas on his land. The opin-
ion cites and relies upon the following quotation from 
Smithfield ;West Bench Irrigation Co. vs. Union Cen-
tral Life Insurance Co., 105 Utah 468, 472, 142 P. 2d 
866!' 868: 
''While in his ditch or upon his land it was h~s 
property and he could use it as he saw fit. When 
the water- reaches the lower end of his land, he 
may again gather it into a ditch and convey it to 
any other land, ditch or reservoir he desires for 
further use; or he may lease it or sell it. But 
once the water h~s passed onto the land of 
another and out of the control of the user, the 
right to use such water passes to the occupant 
of the land upon "\\rhich it then is found, or may 
become water unused by anyone and subject to 
capture and use by the first person to capture 
and use it. If while so free, it flows into another 
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stream it becomes part of such stream.'' 
(Emphasis added) 
The important distinction of these two cases is 
that they both concerned summertime irrigation prac-
tices by a single individual. This court reasoned that 
while the water was on his lwnd the irrrigator did not 
have to waste it, but he could use it as he saw fit. Ap-
pellants have no quarrel with the principle of permit-
ting respondents to make the most beneficial use of the 
water while it is on their land. But this does not mean 
that they can build a reservoir on the main channel of 
the river upstream from their lands and store water 
instead of using it. Nor does the doctrine of Lasson 
vs. Seely mean that respondents are presently entitled 
to flood waters which have never been diverted into 
their canals nor beneficially used. The excessive amount 
of winter water was awarded resp-ondents because there 
was no conswmp·tive use which would prevent the storage 
companies from later acquiring it. As long as respond-
ents u~SE the wat~r on their lands during the periods 
of time that the decree provides, the appellants will 
be protected. Respondents want to store this water 
when not needed and thus acquire water to irrigate 
5000 acres of additional land. 
Respondents were apparently successful in con-
vincing the trial court that under the above-mentioned 
language of Lasson vs. Seely and the Smithfield West 
Bench case that they "had the right to take their water 
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in· a bucket and dump it in the Colorado River; that 
the water belonged to them to do whatever they pleas·ed 
with it." The application of these cases to the Sevier 
River in this manner is fallacious and constitutes re-
versible error. It. is diametrically opposed to the fun-
damental principle of continuous re-use of the waters 
of the Sevier River, by which principle the maximum 
amount of benefit is achieved, in that each party in 
turn USE'S the waters and the return flow is immedi-
ately re-used by lower appropriators. If all primary 
users were permitted to build reservoirs and hold up 
their water for use in July and August the only water 
right worth anything would be to have a point of diver-
sion at the head of the river. The lower reaches of the 
Sevier system would be reclaimed by the desert. 
The lower appropriators on the Sevier River have 
a vested right in the return flow from the use and 
direct application of winter water by respondents. Or 
to put it another way, the lower users have a vested 
right which compels the continuation of the past prac-
tice of respondents using the water and not storing or 
holding it up. 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit G shows that for the ten-year 
period 1940 to 1949 inclusive the average flow of the 
Sevier River past the Hatch measuring station has 
been as follows : 
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MONTH 
5.2 
FLOW OF RIVER 
IN CUBIC 
SECOND FEET 
November ---------~---------------- 73.24 
December -------------------------- 66.2 · 
January ---------------------------- 61.78 
February -------------------------- 64.14 
March -------------------------------- 72.69 
April ---------------------------------- 143.5 
May ------------------------------------ 377.1 
June ---------- .. ------------------------- 263.0 
July ------------------------------------ 114.9 
August ------------------------------ 90.4 
~eptell1ber --------------------~--- 79.7 
















Respondents (Panguitch Valle~_ and Circle Valley) 
have a decreed winter __ water right of 74 cubic second 
feet and a summer flow right of 337.86 cubic ·second 
feet. These figures are the sum total for all the first, 
second and third class rights of all of the respondents 
in this case. It can be seen that these amounts as 
awarded by the Cox Decree exceed the flow of the river 
at Hatch in every month of the year except May when 
there is a 40 second foot surplus in the river. If the 
doctrine of Lasson vs. Seely applied ·to this case entitles 
respondents to STORE the water instead on U·SING it 
under guise of not wasting it, then the ultimate conclu-
sion would be that they could da1n up the river at 
Hatch and throughout the entire year release only 40 
second feet during the month of !fay! 
As we are here painstakingly trying to point out, 
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the respondents h~ve only a vested right to "Q.Se their 
water a,nd if that use i~ t:Qe wintertime results in a 
large return flow to the river, as it necessarily must, 
then appellants have a vested :r;ight to such return flow. 
In defining the vested rights of the parties in order 
to determine whether this change will enlarge one 
right at the expense or impa~rment of the other, the 
respondents cannot ''lean just a ~ittle bit'' on the 
doctrine of Lasson vs. Seely and contend that they 
need not waste their excess winter ·water but we can store 
it, unless they are willing to argue to this court that 
as a matter of right!, under definition of Uta,h law, 
~very primary user on every river system in the state 
is likewise entitled to store his water in a reservoir 
located on the. main channel of the river anq hold it, 
rather than use it. As long as respondents US·E their 
water on their lands during the prescribed period, the 
~dministration of the Sevier River wiU be peacefully 
maintained. But storing winter water for summer use 
does :p.ot constitute winter use. Upon this winter use 
the appellants rely. 
In the ·case of In re North Powder River, 75 Ore. 
83, 93, 144 P. 485, 488, the distinction between owning 
the water itself and owning the right to use it is clearly 
pointed out. The opinion states: 
''Although some of the text-writers and the 
decisions of some of the courts seem to recognize 
that the appropriator may sell the water separ-
ately from the land, this is only upon the theory 
that th~ appropriator owns the water, and not 
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merely the right to the use of it for a particular 
purpose; but, in states in which legislation re-
lating to the use of water has been enacted, it 
is not the water but the use of it for a particular 
purpose that is the limit of the right, and, when 
not needed for that purpose, the next person in 
priority of time is entitled to it, and a prior 
appropriator cannot sell it to a stranger to the 
injury of a subsequent appropriator. This is the 
case in Colorado, Wyoming, and Montana, and 
our own state in 1909 adopted the same rule by 
enacting section 6668, L.O.L. '' 
It is well settled that appropriators from a natural 
stream having certain decreed rights are entitled to 
have the conditions existing upon the stream at the 
date of their appropriations substantially maintained 
unless the change sought will not materially injure 
them. Fort Collins Milling and E. Co. vs. Larimer ~· 
Weld Irrigation Co., 61 Colo. 45, 156 Pac. 140 (citing 
many Colorado cases); City and Cownty of Denver vs. 
·Colorado Land ~ Livestock, 86 Colo. 184, 279 Pac. 46; 
Baker vs. City of Pueblo, 87 Colo. 489, 289 Pac. 603; 
Crockett vs. Jones, 47 Idaho 497, 277 Pac. 550. When 
the water is not actually required by an appropriator 
or is not used, it is at the disposition 6f others accord-
ing to their respective rights and it must be permitted 
to flow down to them as it is wont to flow. Williams vs. 
Altnow, 51 Oregon 275, 95 Pac. 200. 
Therefore, to recapitulate: 
(a) Respondents' vested rights are limited by the 
beneficial use to which they have put the water. They 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
55 
are entitled to use it in the manner and time and £or 
th pu~pose for which such water was decreed. Respond-
ents do not have a vested right to store their water. 
(b) Appellants have a vested right to have re-
spondents use their water at a specified time and place 
and for the particular purpose specified in the State 
Engineer's Proposed Determination and the Cox Decree. 
(c) THE DECREE APPROVING THE APPLICATIONS 
ENLARGES THE VESTED RIGHTS OF RESPONDENTS AT 
THE EXPENSE AND IMPAIRMENT OF APPELLANTS' 
VESTED RIGHTS. 
The fundamental issue in this case is whether or 
not the respondents' proposed change of use from a 
direct flow application to storage and subsequent use 
on the same lands or on 5000 acres of new land in an 
entirely different season of the year can be accomplished 
without damaging the very important rights of lower 
users. The issue is not whether the acquisition of more 
water to put on 5000 additional acres of land will be 
beneficial to the respondents, or whether they can irri-
gate more efficiently if they have a dam to store water 
in. The issue is-will this constitute an enlargement 
of their rights and will it impair appellants' rights 1 
Respondents apparently impressed the trial court with 
the obvious fact that if they got more water, they 
would be better off. The State Engineer's decision was 
reversed and the applications were approved on the 
basis of this argument and in the name of progress. 
(R. 1119). Yet in the Delta-Fillmore region there are 
thousands of acres of better lands which have been 
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cleared and plowed and where ditches have been dug, 
but are bar:ren for lack of water. This Delta-Fillmore 
land has a longer growing season and can produce 
highly cultivated garden crops rath.er than pasturage. 
(Fillmore growing season, 133 days; Delta, 116 day8; 
Panguitch 78 qays; Pltf. Ex. 54 page 65.) The order 
of the lower court is that respondents may proceed with 
the construction of the reservoir and administer them-
selves, the a1nount of return flow that passes the King-
ston Gaging Statio11 and reaches the Piute Reservoir 
to fulfill the lower users' vested rights. The decree 
authorizes this expensive reservoir to be constructed 
without any workable formula attached to safeguard 
appellants' rights in accordance with the Cox Decree. 
The conditions which were improvised are entirely incon-
sistent with one another and are on their face directly 
in conflict with the provisions of the ·Cox Decree. The 
provisions of the judgment permitting measurement of 
water past the Kingston Gaging Station in three-month 
periods comparable to similar years is arbitrary and 
capricious and has no basis in law. 
In order to justify the approval of the change 
applications the trial court has erroneously placed undue 
str~ss upon the very obvious facts expressed in find-
ings (No. 12) that during July, August and September, 
irrigation is of the most importance to applicants; (No. 
~6) that the construction of the reservoir near Hatch 
as proposed by applicants is physically and economi-
cally feasible; (No. 19) that the construction and opera-
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tion of the Piute and Sevier Bridge Reservoir has 
resulted in more efficient use of water and therefore 
the proposed Hatch Reservoir would likewise improve 
and make for a more beneficial and efficient use. But 
the trial court overlooked the fact that the crux of this 
case is that this increased efficiency cannot be achieved 
with another person's water. Appellants have at all 
tin1es admitted, and this court can take judicial notice 
of the fact that any group of· ranchers will be bene-
fited if they can devise a plan whereby they can store 
water in a reservoir (which water has previously 
fio\Yed down the river during winter months) so that 
it can be released during the irrigation season, or be 
''on call'' or otherwise and used upon additional and 
new lands. 
Water cannot be two places at the same time. A~ 
simple as this principle appears, the trial court over-
looked it. Either the storage companies do or they do not 
have the right to receive water during the storaget sea-
son. This right vvhich they claim, was established and 
prescribed by the General Adjudication Decree of the 
Sevier River entered in 1936 by Judge Cox. The re-
spondents claim no storage rights under the Cox 
decree. (Ex. 53, R. 4, 5) The Panguitch and Circle 
Valley people got an excessive amount of winter water 
decreed as a direct fiovv use, excessive because all par-
ties knew the water would be used for culinary purposes 
and the watering of livestock and would then return to 
the stream. The vested right of the storage companies 
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1s to receive the winter water for which respondents 
have no need. The storage companies have received 
the winter flow for more than thirty years. If the 
storage companies do not have the right to insist on 
receiving this winter water then they will never receive 
it at all. The problem is whether Piute or Hatch gets 
this winter flow. For as the witness, T. Clark Callister 
testified: 
''If you withhold 13,000 acre feet in this 
(Hatch) reservoir in April that ordinarily would 
have gone to the (Piute) reservoir, you take 
13,000 acre feet out of the (Piute) reservoir. 
That's simple as A. B. C." (R. 689) 
The witnesses for appellants all testified that to 
impound winter water at H.atch for summer irrigation 
on the same lands plus 5000 additional acres would, of 
a certainty, impair lower users' vested rights. Plain-
tiffs' expert, Dr. Israelson, was asked if the use of 
stored water later in the season would decrease the 
amount of water available to downstream users (R. 252). 
He replied : ''It is my opinion that the storage of the 
13,650 acre feet as proposed would not decrease the 
annual flow to the lower users'' (emphasis added). This 
careful selection of language shows that Israelson only 
thought that the water if applied on the same lands would 
eventually, within a year's time reach the lower users. 
Immediately, upon cross-examination he stated that the 
time of return flow would be changed (R. 253), but he 
thought that the Piute Reservoir would iron out any 
differences; that it ''Tould give the downstream us~rs 
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adequate protection for change in time of return flow. 
This testimony is the whole foundation of respondents' 
case that vested rights would not be impaired, yet if the 
time of return flow is changed, I which Dr. Israelson ad-
mitted it \Vould be, the water will be taken from other 
users which injury Dr. Israelson ignored. 
Israelson also testified that if the water was appli~d 
to the new lands, the time and quantity of return flow 
would be changed. He stated that the return flow would 
be nearly the same if a very subst.antial chwnge in prac-
tice on 10,000 waterlogged acres was made (R. 256). 
This issue of the waterlogged acres is foreign to this 
case as it was not made a part of the applications or 
the pleadings or the findings and decree. (R. 107) The 
gist of Israelson's testimony. is that the quantity of 
return flow would be very substantially reduced when 
the water was applied to the new land and that appel-
lants' vested rights will be impaired both as to time 
and quantity of return flow by the approval of respond-
ents' applications. Respondents in this regard not only 
completely failed in their burden of proving that _5000 
ne\v acres could be irrigated and winter water im-
pounded until the following summer without injuring 
appellants, but Israelson's testimony admits that lower 
appropriators' vested rights will be impaired. In 
.American Fork ~Irrigation Company vs. Linke (Utah 
1951), 239 P. 2d 188, this court stated: 
''We recognize plaintiffs' duty to prove that 
vested rights will not be impaired by approval 
of their application, but we also recognize that 
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such duty must not be niade unreasonably oner-
ous, to the point where every remote but presently 
indeterminable vested right must be pinpointed." 
Because the right to change the point of diversion 
is a conditional right and does not exist at all unless it 
can be exercised without injury to other vested right$, 
the party who asserts such right has the burden of 
proving. that the change will not injuriously affect the 
vested rights of others although this may involve proof 
of a negative. Irrigation Co. vs. Water Supply and 
Storage Co., 49 Colo. 1, 111 P~c. 610; Farmers' High 
Line Canal & Reservoir ·Co. vs. 'Wolff, 23 Colo. App. 
570, 131 P. 291. 
It is not enough to merely provide in the judg-
ment and decree that the applications are approved 
"on the conditions that no vested rights will be im-
paired" for the hearings before the State Engineer and 
before the District Court are brought for the determina-
tion of this very issue. The question presented for admin-
istrative or judicial determination is whether it is prob-
able or improbable that the change applications will 
result in vested rights being impaired if approved. 
Eardly vs. Terry, 94 Utah 367, 77 P. (2) 362 at page 
365; Whitmore vs. Murray City, i07 Utah 445, 154 P. (2) 
748 at page 750; United States vs. District ·Court (Utah), 
238 P. (2) 1132 at page 1135. 
Appellants contend that the trial court failed to 
appreciate the importance of the time of return flow 
to the protection of lower users' vested rights. 
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Respondents' :plan of "bunching up" their rights 
to IJlake fl. greater use of w~ter during t4e hot dry 
summer months cannot possibly operate without up-
setthlg the basis of the Co~ Decree ~n<l the a,.dm.inistra-
tion of the Sevier River as it operates under that decree. 
Respondents will acquire more summer water than was 
originally decreed to them. It was the intent and pur-
pose of the Cox Deere~ to give the wint~r w&ters to 
the primary users for direct application only and for 
t4e wjnter season only. This fact is borne out by th~ 
t~me of use $pecified in the d.ecree. All water users have 
their winter flow and summer flow separately sta,ted. 
Thus, at page 9 of the Decree, the primary right of the 
respondents is set forth for the period of use Ma,rch 
15th to November 15th and they share proportionately 
in the lump award of 44 cubic feet per second for use 
during the period from November 15th to March 15th 
(page 10 of the Decree). Bacon's Bible which is the 
Proposed Determination of Water Rights on the Sevier 
River by the State Engineer (Defend~nts' Exhibit 52) 
and which document is the basis for the Cox Decree 
classifies this winter water a,s "Domestic". For instance, 
the Long Canal Co. at page 15 of Exhibit 52 was to 
receive 5 c.f.s. for "Domestic ... use of 75 persons and 
1000 head of stock". It was culinary water. 
It becomes perfectly obvious that the change appli-
cations constitute an enlargement of the respondents" 
rights when we consider the provisions of Section 
73-3-3, U. C.A. 1953, which provides : 
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''Any person entitled to the use of water 
may change the place of diversion or use and 
may use the water for other purposes than those 
for which it was originally appropriated, but no 
such change shall be made if it impairs any vested 
right without just compensation. Such changes 
may be perma!lent or temporary. Changes for 
an indefenite length of time with an intention to 
relinguish the original point of diversion, place 
or purpose of use are defined as permanent 
changes." (Emphasis added) 
The above statute clearly indicates that in order 
to secure a permanent change of point of diversion or 
place or purpose of use, there must be a definite inten-
tion to relinquish the original point of diversion, or 
place or purpose of use, and not to retain the original 
place and purpose of use and acquire a new and addi-
tional place and purpose of use. The respondents' 
applications clearly show they do not propose to relin-
quish anything pertaining to their present beneficial 
use or place of use, but on the contrary their applica-
tions show and their testimony discloses that they intend 
to continue the irrigation of all of the lands for whic11 
their water was awarded, and to irrigate 5000 acres in 
addition thereto, and that they intend to use all of their 
summer direct flow rights on all of their lands and in 
addition thereto use their winter flow rights, for which 
they have had no past beneficial use, in the summer 
months, thus giving them a double summer water right. 
If this court should permit the respondents to 
change their less valuable winter flow rights into suul-
mer use on 5000 new acres of land, then every \vinter 
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flow user up and do\vn the stream will likewise seek the 
same thing. In fact there are several irrigation and 
canal companies who are defendants and appellants in 
the present action and who have already selected res-
ervoir sites to store their own winter water, should 
the court ever hold that such can be done. To mentio!l 
a few of such reservoir sites, there is one at the head 
of Circleville Canyon and another one in the vicinity 
of Marysvale, and Junction. Dams could be built at 
these sites of sufficient size to impound all of the water 
which is now received by Sevier Bridge and Piute Res-
ervoirs combined. (R. 1110) 
Water is needed primarily for irrigation in the 
growing season. That is the time when parties are 
anxious about the size of their stream. The storage 
companies primarily rely on what they acquire during 
the winter and early spring runoff. Thus if the court 
should now determine that winter rights can be stored 
and held for summer use, an entirely new principle will 
be injected into the Cox Decree. Seventy-five years of 
water administration on the Sevier River will be thrown 
aside. Consternation will reig-n. Here we have a case 
where the evidence demonstrates conclusively that there 
is total consumption of the waters of the river. If the 
change sought by respondents increases their beneficial 
use, as they allege it will, then such change is certain 
to adversely effect the beneficial use now derived from 
the waters by appellants. The river is so perfectly 
harnessed that every disturbance must injure some 
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one. As the court state·d in Hutchinson vs. Stricklin 
146 Oregon 285, 28 P. 2d 225, 228: 
'' Th~ system adopted by the lawmakers of 
this state, in the w~ter code and its amendments 
and other statutes, when the water rights of the 
several parties on a stream and its tributaries 
have be~n adj~dicated, m~.y be liken~d to a net ... 
work, all the differ~nt parts of which form a com-
plete whole. To a certain extent, one right de-
pends upon another, and if a part of the network 
is displaced it will disarrange and prejudice the 
other parties, although the part removed is a, 
prior right, with a date of relative priority, 
earlier than many of the other rights, and it 
would_ be ~omething like taking a link out of a 
' ' 
chain.'' 
This same basic scientific fact, to-wit: That where 
a stream has been entirely appropriated, an increased 
use of the waters in one part of the system must result 
in a corresponding decreased use in another part, h~s 
also been expressed by the Supreme Court of Colorado. 
In Farmers' High Line Canal q Reservoir Co. vs. Wolff, 
23 Colo. App. 570, 131 P. 291-295, the court stated: 
"It is a matter of common kno\vledge that, 
except on streams in which the appropriations 
have not exceeded the constant supply, few 
instances arise in which the change of place of 
diversion of large quantities of water for a long 
distance, can be made without substa~ tial injury 
to juniors, and the utmost care and scrutiny is 
required to guard against such injury.'' 
The case at bar insofar as it concerns the approval 
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of the applications which propose to irrigate 5000 acres 
.of new land is identical with Enlarged Southside lr1'"i-
gation Di.tch Co. et al. vs. John's Flood Ditch Co., et al. 
(Colo.), 210 P. 2d 982 wherein the court stated: 
''Counsel for defendants in error discuss at 
length the question of changed place of use, and 
cite authority pertinent thereto, but nowhere is 
there any substantial evidence or contention of 
decreased acreage or decreased use of these water 
rights on the lands for which they.were appropri-
ated and on which they are still used. The· end 
sought here is not changed use, but additional use. 
It is not sought to use the water to irrigate lands 
under the Model tract instead of using it upon 
the Hoehne lands for irrigation for which it was 
decre~d; rather it is sought to continue full irri-
gation of the lands for which it was decreed, and 
even to increase such use, .and at the same time 
to irrigate additional lands therewith, thus in-
creasing the length of time of diversion and con-
tinuing the use of water which should be returned 
to the stream for th~ benefit of other appropria-
tors. This may not be done.'' (Italics added) 
In the earlier Colorado case, Ft. Lyon ·C.anal Com-
pa;ny vs. Chew, 33 Colo. 392, 81 Pac. 37, the court said: 
''The appropriation must be made in con-
nection with some particular tract of land, and, 
though it be not essential to its continued exist-
ence that the application shall be forever con-
fined to the identical land for which the diversion 
was made, yet, so long as the water is used in con-
nection With that land, it cannot be made to do 
duty thereto, and at the same time or in the same 
season be used for the irrigation of some other 
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tract, as against the rights of other appropriators 
which have theretofore attached.'' (Italics 
added) 
There are two Colorado cases which concern the 
question of a primary user's right to store its irrigation 
waters. In Colorado Milling and Elevator Company vs. 
Larimer and 'Weld lr,rigation Company, 26 Colorado 47, 
56 Pac. 185, the court held that the defendant irrigation 
company could. not store its waters which were decreed 
to it for a direct flow use and thereby cut down the size 
of the stream which plaintiff milling company needed 
for its mill-race. In this case, like the instant one, the 
irrigation company sought to store its direct flow rights 
after a statutory adjudication had settled the rights of 
the respective parties on Cache La Poudre River ia 
Larimer County, Colorado. The entire opinion could 
profitably be quoted in this brief, but to paraphrase, 
the court held : That the decree gran ted a direct flow 
right, that the decree did not contemplate or provide for 
the storage of such water, that the irrigation company 
in effect sought to D?-ake another appropriation for an-
other purpose or use ''at a time when the water thus 
taken was not needed for the use for which it was origi-
nally appropriated", that the irrigation company could 
change its use from that for which it was originally 
appropriated and decreed but it could not exercise this 
right in such manner as to infringe on the rights of 
the plaintiff. In its opinion the court emphasizes the 
fact that the irrigation company could not change it~ 
decreed direct flow right into a storage right to the 
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detriment of the plaintiff milling company ''by an en-
larged or another use, measured by either volume or 
ti'me which would result in depriving plaintiff of its 
appropriation under that decree". This case clearly 
expresses appellants' contentions as to the importance 
of time of return flow under the Cox Decree. 
In Seven Lakes Reservoir Co. vs. New Loveland ~ 
Greely Irrigation ~ Land Co., 40 Colo. 382, 93 Pac. 485, 
a storage of irrigation waters was permitted in an 
opinion written by the same Judge (Gabbert J.) who 
wrote the Colorado Milling and Elevator case. It does. 
not appear from the opinion that there were any lower 
users on the stream whose rights were jeopardized. 
The opinion states: ''This change is in no manner 
detrimental to the rights of the appellee". 
There has been considerable argument and discus-
sion both before the State Engineer and in the trial 
of thi~ case before the District Court concerning Amer,i~ 
cwn Fork Irrigation Co. vs. Linke (Utah 1951), 239 P. 
2d 188. In that case the Supreme Court of Utah (Mr. 
Justice Henriod) affirmed the District Court's deter-
mination that the vested rights of the parties opposing 
a change application whereby direct-flow rights would 
be stored for subsequent summer use would not be 
impaired. 
In the American Fork case the applicant irriga-
tion companies proposed to build a mountain reservoir 
with a capacity of 1000 acre feet on the headwaters of 
American Fork Canyon. The proposed reservoir site 
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was about 15 miles from the applicants' diversion weir 
at the mouth of American: Fork Canyon. The applicants 
proposed to store the high spring runoff from April 
1 to June 15 of each year .. The stored water was to be 
released between April .1 and October 30. The water 
was to be applied to the same ground which applicants 
had previously irrigated. There was no additional land 
to he developed in that case such as the 5000 new acres 
recently acquired by respondents herein. The drainage 
and percolation of the stored waters when applied to 
the same. lands would reach Utah Lake in the late 
summer months. The surface evaporation from Utah 
Lake averaged about 231,000 acre feet between May 1 
and September 1 as compared to an average flow into 
the Jordan River of 207,000 acre f~et during the same 
period of time. The protestants to the American Fork 
Irrigation Co.; 's application were Kennecott Copper 
Corporation, Utah Po:wer & Light Company and various 
canal companies in Salt Lake ·County who took their 
water from the Jordan River. Besides American Fork 
Creek, Utah Lake receives its supply from Battle Creek, 
Grove Creek, Alpine Creek and Fort Canyon Creek as 
well as the Provo River through the Provo Reservoir 
Canal. David I. Gardner, Utah Lake Commissioner, 
testified in that case that the evaporation from Utah 
Lake was greater than both evaporation and transpira-
tion from the cultivated areas lying easterly from the 
Lake. There was also evidence that in 1948 30 000 acre 
' ' feet of water had been wasted into Great Salt Lake and 
at the time of trial in March, 1951 the volume of water 
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wasting into Great Salt Lake was estimated at between 
200 and 275 second feet. (Volume 615, Bound Briefs 
of the Supreme Court of Utah) Thus the opinion of 
Mr. Justice Henriod states: 
"This case is based on its own peculiar facts 
and is not a precedent for ~y where facts may 
differ .... In storing the 1000 feet of water the 
surface area at the dam would be about equal 
to the increaseds-grface area therein. The evapor-
ation at the higher elevation of the proposed dam 
admittedly would be less, probably one-half than 
at the Lake. Surface evaporation oil. the Lake 
actually exceeds the amount flowing out of the 
Lake and ayailable to defendants between May 
and September.'' (Emphasis added) 
The very important differences in the American 
Fork case are : 
(1) The large volume of water wasted into Great 
Salt Lake. (2) Utah Lake evaporation (231,000 acre 
feet) served as an overwhelming factor to any possible 
impairment of vested rights by the storage of 1000 acre 
feet. (In the instant case the evaporation loss at the 
Hatch Town dam is 300 acre feet more than if the same 
water were stored in the Piute Reservoir (R. 397, 398) ). 
(3) The later use of the stored waters was made in 
the same season and on the same lands that had pre-
viously been irrigated. (In the instant case applicants 
intend to use a winter right (non-consumptive) for sum-
mer consumptive use. In the American Fork case there 
was no increased acreage such as the 5000 acres p-roposed 
I 
to be developed in this case.) (4) There was no problem 
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of lapse of time of return flo"'... affecting the seasonal 
rights of the storage companies and the primary users 
in the Sevier Valley. (5) The problem of administer-
ing the trial court's decree so as not to impair vested 
rights was delegated to the State Engineer and not 
given to the change-applicants as in the instant case, 
It is the development of the 5000 acres of new 
land and the bunching up of winter water for more 
extensive summer use which has always been objection-
able to the protestants in the instant case. These fea-
tures were not present in the American Fork Irrigation 
Co. case. Because of the close proximity of the irri-
gated lands in Circle Valley to the Piute Reservoir the 
impairment of the vested storage rights if the respond-
ents' plan is successful can be foreseen as a matter of 
absolute certainty. 
No engineers, experts, college professors or govern-
ment administrators can convince the farmers and 
settlers on the lower part of the Sevier River that they 
will not be hurt if this court permits the upper users to 
store, winter water for which they have had no past 
need, for a summer use. The evaporation, loss in transit 
through the canal, and consumptive use on the 5000 
acres of new land will totally consume the 13,000 ·acre 
feet of water which is proposed to be stored in the 
reservoir. The trial court's decree permitting respond-
ents to store and concentrate their water for an increasea 
summer use IF they do not impair vested rights of 
lower users is as paradoxical as an order to jump up 
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in the air, but don't come down. The impossibility of an 
attempt at either can be foreordained. 
POINT 4 
THE DECREE TAKES FROM THE STATE ENGINEER 
AND THE RIVER COMMISSIONERS THE ADMINISTRA· 
TION OF THE RIVER ABOVE THE KINGSTON GAGING 
STATION AND UNLAWFULLY VESTS SUCH ADMINIS-
TRATION IN THE RESPONDENTS. 
The trial court ''literally threw the book'' at ap-
pellants. In approving respondents' change applica-
tions subject to the condition that "the yield of the 
river at Kingston Measuring Station on the South Fork 
of the Sevier River shall be maintained as it would have 
been under similar periods of time in previous similar 
years," (Paragraph 7 of the Judgement and Decree, 
Judgement Roll 59), the trial court delegated the duty 
to administer such conditions to the respondents! Find-
ing Number 19 states: 
''But in view of the fact that the applicants 
propose in addition to setting up an 'on call' sys-
tem at Hatch, to also irrigate new lands in Gar-
field County, and to level and otherwise 'mod-
ernize' the farm lands in Piute and Garfield 
Counties, all of which would ordinarily entail a 
very complicated situation insofar as the distri-
bution of the waters of the South Fork of the 
Sevier River is concerned, and that the State 
Engineer (and the water commissioners) should 
not be charged with the direct responsibility of 
seeing to it that the defendants get their full 
water rights at Kingston station on the South 
Fork of the Sevier River between 16 March and 
14 November, inclusive of each year while plain-
tiffs operate under said applications, but that 
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duty should be charged to plaintiffs as a con-
dition to the approval of their several applica-
tio~s." (Emphasis added) 
What kind of law is this 1 These appellants should 
never be required to permit the respondents to pick and 
choose some '' similar period of ·time in previous similar 
years'' and thereby fix the amount of water that appel-
lants get. The last guardian in the world to whom appel-
lants would entrust the resp·onsibility of seeing that the1r 
vested decreed rights are not impaired are these re-
spondents. Under the Cox Decree the storage com-
panies are en titled to all the water not used by the pri-
mary users and the statute only permits a change if 
these vested rights are not impaired. The only possible 
manner by which respondents can fill their proposed 
reservoir and contend that the appellants' vested rights 
are not impaired is through the margin of leeway al-
lowed to them in selecting some other ''similar period 
of time''. 
As shown by plaintiff's Exhibit G, reproduced at 
page 20 of this brief, the flow of the river past the 
Kingston Gaging Station during the month of June 
has varied from 9.2 cubic second feet (1946) to 481 
cubic second feet (1941). Thus the tremendous amount 
of latitude granted respondents to pick and choose 
some other similar period of time to determine what 
water appellants are entitled to receive can be appre-
ciated. The River Commissioners with their experience 
and background in administering the waters under the 
Cox Decree are much more competent than respondents 
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to handle any ''complicated situation insof3rr as the 
distribution of the waters of the South Fork of the 
Sevier River is concerned". 
The provisions of the Utah statute r~l~_ting to the 
appointment of river comw.issioners do not provide for, 
nor do they contemplate, the appointment of a group of 
partisan water users such as respondents to administer 
th~ flow of a river. The pertinent provisions of the 
statute are: (All citations are to Utah Code~ Annot~te,d, 
1953) 
73-2~1 
''He (State Engineer) shall have general ad-
ministrative supervision of the waters of th~ 
state, and of the measurement, appropriation, ap-
portionment and distribution thereof. He shaJl 
have power to make and publish such rules and 
regulations as may be necessary from time to 
time fully to C'arry out the duties of his office, 
and p~rticularly to secure the equitable and fair 
apportionment and distribution of the water ac-
cording to the respective rights of appropria-
tors.'' 
73-5-1 
''Whenever in the judgment of the state 
engineer, or the district court, it is necessary 
to appoint one or more water commissioners for 
the distribution of water from any river system 
or water source, such commissioner or commis-
sioners shall be appointed annually by the state 
engineer, after consultation with the water users. 
The form of such consultation and notice to be 
given shall be determined by the state engineer 
as shall best suit local conditions, full expression 
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of majority opinion being, however, provided 
for.'' 
73-5-3 
''The state engineer and his duly authorized 
assistants shall carry into effect the judgments 
of the courts in relation to the division, distribu-
tion or use of water under the provisions of this 
title." 
There are several conflicting and incomplete expres-
sions in the findings as to just how the Judgment and 
Decree of the lower court is to be administered, but 
it,is apparent that the trial court considered the interest 
of respondents antagonistic to that of the State Engi-
neer and the presently appointed Sevier River Commis-
sioners. This was due to the contradictory testimony of 
the amount of winter water which respondents testified 
that they used in the past several years compared to the 
river commissioners' report of the winter diversions ac-
tually made. Notwithstanding the fact the River Commis-
sioners based their records on mechanical devices which 
devices were found by the ·court to be reasonably accu-
rate and upon actual measurements and estimates made 
by the water commissioners the court found that such 
records "do not accurately reflect all of the water di-
verted by plaintiffs during freezing weather and par-
ticularly is this true as to the winter water". There-
fore the trial court attempted to relieve the State 
Engineer's office of any and all authority above the 
Kingston Gaging Station and to give respondents a 
free hand in selecting a ''similar period of time'' in 
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order to determine what amounts of water need be 
supplied in order to fulfill appellants' vested rights. 
Paragraph 7 of the Judgment and Decree (Judgment 
Roll 60) does not contemplate that the River Commis-
sioners and the respondents shall work together but said 
paragraph states: 
''And shguld any dispute arise between the 
River Commissioners and the plaintiffs concern-
ing the amount of water to be delivered at the 
above point between the periods of time above 
specified, such dispute shall be referred by either 
or both of said parties to the :State Engineer who 
shall (in aid of the court) summarily determine 
such question, using the formula set out in this 
and the following paragraph of this Decree.'' 
(Emphasis added) 
The statutory purpose for appointing water commis-
sioners is to select a non-partisan commissioner to dia-
tribute and apportion the waters of a river. The river 
commissioner is to be appointed annually by the State 
Engineer 73-5-1, supra. In Minersville Reservoir and 
Irrigation Co. vs. Rocky Ford Irrigation Co., 90 Utah 
283, 61 P. 2d 605, the Supreme Court of Utah stated: 
''The primary purpose of a water commis-
sioner is to assist the court in carrying out its 
decrees. His duties are to aid the courts and the 
state engineer in the distribution to the various 
water users of the quantity of water to which each 
is entitled. The commissioner is an arm of the 
court and the state engineer in enforcing and 
protecting the various water users in their rights. 
He is appointed by the state engineer upon recom-
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mendation of the interested water users. The 
, state engineer may remove him for cause upon an 
applic~tion of a water user and a he1\ring h~d 
thereon. The same power i,:p.heres in the co-u.rt 
under which he serves .... The authority and 
duty of a com·missioner to distribute water to one 
or more users holding the right to the use thereof 
does not cease merely because one of them has 
undertaken to -maintain a mea;ns of storing and 
conveying s~ch water to the place of use. If such 
a construction were given to the law it would, 
in many instances, fail in its purpose." (Em--
phasis added) 
In CaldweU v. Erick~on, (il Utah 265, 213 Pfl,c. 182, 
there is a complete discussion of the legislative intent 
concerning passage of the statutes with which we are 
presently concerned. The holding of that decision h;: 
''. ~ .. th,a,t the Legi~lature must pave deliberately 
intended that the state engineer should be given 
such control, and that the appointment of a com-
missioner by him, when lawfully made, should 
s:p.persede a,ny appointment made by the court, 
under ·~ former decree.'' 
There is no authority or pretext of judicial fairness 
1n relieving the state engineer and the river commis-
sioners whom he has appointed of the administration 
of the wa.ters of the Sevier River above the Kingston 
Gaging Station and delegating that duty to respondents; 
particularly to allow respondents to select ''some similar 
period of time'' as the measuring rod of appellants' 
rights. The presently appointed River Con1missioners 
who have ad1ninistered the waters in Panguitch and 
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Circle 'Talley fqr t~e past tel). yea~s are the proper 
persons tq po~tinue to do so. Fo:u a court to appoipt one 
of th~ pa:rti~s in a- highly contested water case to serve 
as a commissioner whose dut~e~ are: (1) to determ~~~ 
what the other party's rights are, and (2) s~e tp.at 
those r~ghts are fulfilled, is a miscarriage of judicial 
authority. 
POINT 5 
(A) THE DECREE IN EFFECT A~ROGATES THE COX 
DECREE NOTWITHSTANDING THE PROCEEDINGS BE-
FORE THE TRIAL COURT WERE MERELY TO REVIEW 
T~E STf\TE ENGINEER'S REJECTION OF RESPONDENTS' 
APPLICATION$. -- , . . ~ -. , 
Prior to the decision of the trial court in this ,case, 
the distribution and apportionment of all the waters 
of the Sevier River were administered under the Cq4 
Decree. Now, in effect there is a Jones Decree which 
governs the river above the Kingston Gaging Station. 
The amount of water which p~sses the Kingston sta-
tion will no longer be the normal retq.rn flow from the 
application of the waters to the same lands and at the 
same time as was provide~ in the Proposed Determi-
nation and the Cox Decree. The triaJ court's improvised 
form-q.la and respondents choice of a ''similar period of 
time'' thereunder will now control the amount that is 
to be let down to appellants. The Qo~ Decree has been 
rescinded insofar as it prescribed a period of winter 
use from November 15th to March 15th. The provisions 
of time which are specified in the Cox Decree have no 
meaning insofar as respondents are concerned. And 
because the Cox Decree has been abrogated in the~e 
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provisions the amounts of cubic feet per second awarded 
for summer use·may also be disregarded by respondents 
for they now have the trial court's approval to apply 
greater amounts of summer water to their lands. How 
much greater is left to their discretion. 
·Under respondents theory as expressed In their 
applications: 
''Water will be stored when not needed~ and 
when needed the water will be run throvgh the 
reservoir. This is in order to improve the use 
of the water, conserving it when not needed for 
use in more critical seasons of the year. '' (Pis. 
Ex. A, a-2329, Emphasis added) 
Certainly, the Cox Decree did not award to any 
one water that 'vas not needed, and on the contrary the 
Cox Decree provides at page 231: 
"That the rights herein decreed are founded 
upon appropriations of water for beneficial uses, 
and the ·rights herein decreed are subject to the 
condition that they are required and necessary for 
beneficial uses, and such rights are subject to the 
limitations and conditions that the same are used 
for beneficial purposes, economically and with-
out waste. Any water diverted from the said 
river and/ or its tributaries, not beneficially used 
under the rights of the respective parties to this 
decree shall be returned to the river by the most 
practical and direct route.'' 
The Cox Decree only awarded the primary users a 
right to dip into the river and take therefron1 when 
the 'vater was needed and could be put to beneficial use. 
The beneficial use for which the winter water was decreed 
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''From November 15th to March 15th'' of each year was 
certainly not a beneficial use in the following July and 
August. 
The Jones Decree has changed and modified every 
provision of the Cox Decree. The stated cubic feet 
per second that was awarded respondents for summer 
use \Vill now be exceeded. The decreed cubic feet per sec-
ond were taken as the basis for all of respondents' ex-
hibits and charts to show how they would store 13,000 
acre feet of water. Thus, provisions as to time, place, 
purpose and beneficial use that have always been so im-
portant in the exercise and owner ship of water rights 
have been scrapped and ignored while the paper title to 
so many cubic feet per second awarded in the decree 
is claimed as respondents' vested rights without regard 
to the other inherent elements that attend this use right. 
(B) THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDIC-
TION TO MAKE ANY INTERPRETATION, CONSTRUCTION 
OR MODIFICATION OF THE COX DECREE AND THE 
COURT'S ACTION IN THIS RESPECT WAS UNLAWFUL 
AND VOID. UNDER THE GUISE OF REVIEWING THE 
ACTION OF THE STATE ENGINEER THE TRIAL COURT 
UNLAWFULLY ADJUDICATED WATER RIGHTS. 
In United States v. District Court (Utah 1951), 238 
P. 2d 1132, this court speaking through Mr. Justice 
Wade stated at page 1136 : 
''The district court's judgment in reviewing 
the engineer's decision is limited to the issues 
determinable by the engineer and in general has 
the same effect as though it were made by him. 
The question to be determined is whether or not 
under the facts established in that court the 
engineer's decision should be upheld or reversed 
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taking ipto account the stat~tory powers of the 
engineer ~ut the court may not Q.eter~~ne i~sp.~~ 
not within the pow~r of the engineer to determin~. 
In the case of an application to ~ppropriate or 
to change the place of qiversion 0! use, it merely 
approves or rejects the application without de-
termining the priorities of the parties, .... '~ 
A long line of Utah decisions were cited, and are author-
ity for the above quoted excerpt. They are: In r~ 
Application 7600, 63 Utah 311, 225 P. 605; Eardley v~ 
Terry, 94 Utah 367, 77 P. 2d 362; Tanner v. Bacon, 103 
Utah 494, 136 P. 2d 957; Whitmore v. Murray City, 107 
Utah 445, 154 P. 2d 748. 
+n the instant case, the district court ~ot on~:r 
adjudicated water rights and determined priorities~ 
(Finding of Facts, Nos. 6, 7, and 11) it set forth ~ 
forrp.ula by which appellants' vested water rights are 
purportedly measured and determined. Par~graph 7 
of the Judgment and Decree (Judgm~nt Roll 58) pro-
vides that appellants are entitled to: 
''. . . . the yield of the r1ver . . . . as it would 
have been under similar periqds of time in previ-
ous similar years. ' ' 
Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Decree state as follows: 
"8. Tl.e computations of the volun1e of 
water to b ~ so delivered by applicants at said 
Kingston 1\~easuring Station on said South Fork 
of the Sevier River are to be ·based on the follow-
ing volumer~ and periods of time (all at said 
l{ingston Measuring Station on the South Fork 
of said Sevr~r River) : 
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(i) The volume of river yield for the three-
month period March 16 to June 15, normally a 
period of high river yield, and 
. (2) The volumes ,for the three-n1onth period 
June 16 to September 15, normally a period of low 
water yield, a.nd . . 
(3) The volumes for the two-month period 
September 16 to November 14. 
'' 9. And said applicants (plaintiffs) are 
hereby charged with the .duty of enforcing the 
conditions under which these applications are 
approved.'' 
No provision at all is made for the selection of 
any ''similar period of time'' for the winter months. 
Paragraph 6 of the Judgment and Decree states that 
during the period from November 15th to March 15th 
the respondents cannot divert water and store it at tho 
same time except upon the consent of the Sevier Water 
Commissioners. Nothing is said about delivering at 
Ringston any water during the winter months.· At the 
close of the argument Mr. Dudley Crafts asked the 
court (R. 1121): 
''MR. CRAFTS: Just one question and that 
is: Do you make any distinrtion between the 
winter months and summer, v. hy the same pro-
visions shouldn't be required in the winter that 
you make in the ~ummer~ That is, that they 
should deliver at the Kingston ineasuring station 
the same amount that we would have received 
before the applications were rr ade ~ 
''THE COURT : I don't k1 ow whether I can 
answer that or not, but I '11 attempt it. I'm fear-
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ful it will have some holes shot in it perhaps in 
this v~ry room in a few months. But, gentlemen, 
as I see it, if there are any rights to modify 
decreed rights in a statutory adjudication, then 
certainly those rights under our method of living 
and being in these Rocky ~ountains, must look· 
to the winter time for storage. So, Mr. Crafts, 
all I can say to you is that this court feels that 
some change of-use was and is contemplated under 
the Cox Decree, and the court has less hesitation 
about interferring with the so-called ves.ted rights 
by permitting a. freer and more liberal storage 
during the winter months than it would dare at-
tempt to do in the other months of the year. I 
admit that's rather weak reasoning, but it's in 
the record for what it ;s worth.'' (Emphasis 
·added) 
So the Jones Decree is silent as to how or whom should 
see that the flow of the river is not diminished during the 
winter. ''A freer and more liberal storage (by re-
spondents) during the winter months" is sanctioned by 
the decree. And so far as any specific expression 
in the Decree is concerned, this might mean the storage 
of all winter flow. 
If any dispute should arise between the River Com-
missioners and the respondents concerning the amount 
of water that appellants are to receive: 
'' .... such dispute shall be referred by either or 
both of said parties to the State Engineer who 
shall (in aid of the court) summarily determine 
such question, using the formula set out. in this 
and the following paragraph of this Decree.'' 
(Emphasis added-paragraph 7 of the Judgment 
and Decree) 
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The unmistakable ,meaning of this language is that 
appellants' vested rights are no longer to be determined 
according to the Cox Decree. They are now measured 
by the instant Judgment and Decree. This adjudica-
tion of water rights is clearly erroneous~ 
Respondents' rights were enlarged; appellants' 
rights were diminished and the determination of the vol-
ume of water that appellants shoud receive was vested in 
the respondents after the court had stated several times 
during the proceedings that all it would ·do would be 
to approve or repect the appli~ations. (R. 10, 11). The 
court was fully apprised of the law stated in Eardley 
v. Terry and United States v. District Court, supra. 
The Judgment and Decree in this case states that 
vested rights will not be impaired if the change appli-
cations are granted, and at the same time the Decree 
determines, and say~ in plain language that the appel-
lants are not entitled to the water which they have here-
tofore appropriated and received! Paragraph 7 of the 
amended Conclusions of Law (Judgment Roll, 68) states 
that the water delivered to the Kingston measuring sta-
tion shall be in an amount: 
''. . . . at least equal to the average volume of 
the same period ( wnseasonable floods and 
'breaks' excluded) of snow, and rain; said com-
putation to be based on a volume for the said 
period and not as of any particular day, disaster 
or other unseasonable heavy flows of water ex-
cepted." (Emphasis added) · 
In choosing the amount of flow for the previous ''similar 
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period of time'' by which appelhints' rights are to be 
measured, tlie resporidents may deduct airy water which 
passed Kingston due to ''bifeaks'' (in diversion dams), 
''diaste~" or other ''unseasonable heavy flows of water. 
For instance, respondents may choose the three-month 
~eriod June i6 to September i5 for the year 1945 
as the shnilar period of tiine to govern the flow 
~f water that should be delivered at Kingston for these 
same months in 1956. But if the. respondents can recall 
a ''heavy unseasonable flow'' during the summer of 
1945, this amount may be deducted from the 1956 de-
termined flow at Kingston under the Jones Decree. 
The 1945 flood water was received at the Piute reser-
voir and became either storage water or it may have 
gone to the primary users in ·Sevier Valley. But the 
Jones Decree says this water never did belong to these 
ap:Pelhints. This adjudication of water rights has been 
made in an appeal from a decision of the State Engineer 
rejecting the proposed changes sought by respondents. 
i I!· ' · I 
This is an adjudication that the appropriations made 
by lower primary users, appellants herein, in 1860 and 
appropriations of the unused waters of the River made 
by the appellant storage companies between 1902 and 
1912 are nullified and rescinded. It means that re-
spondents' paper title to water which ··for the past 
thirty years has never been diverted, nor used may now 
be asserted and exercised. Such an adjudication in this 
proceeding is not only contrary to the doctrine of 
Eardley v. Terry and U.S. v. District Court supra but 
' ' 
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is also opposed to the Cox Decree and the Utah statutes. 
The Cox Decree awarded any and all water in any way 
accumulated in said reservoirs in excess of primary 
rights to the storage companies. In accordance there-
. ;l 
with the storage companies have collected and impounded 
. ' 
the ''unseasonable heavy flows of water" which could 
not be used by the primary users. This water has been 
appropriated and used by the appellant s.tora~e com-
panies and constitutes their vested decreed right. Sec-
tion 73-1-3, U.C.A. 1953 provides: 
''Beneficial use shall be the basis, the meas-
ure and ~he limit of all rights to use the waters 
in this state." 
As pointed out at page 42 of this brief (De'fini'tion and 
Determination of the Vested Rights of Respondents), 
the respondents have no right to water which they have 
never used. The trial court did not have jurisdiction 
in the first plac~ to adjudicate water rights in this pro-
~eeding, and in exceeding its jurisdiction and taking 
water belonging to appellants and awarding it to re-
spondents, the court erred in its determination of such 
rights. 
POINT· 6 
THE DECREE IS ARBITRARY AND UNCONSCION-
ABLE AND THE fORMULA ADO.PTED BY THE . TRIAL 
COURT IS WITHOUT SUPPORT IN THE EVIDENCE. THE 
FI~DINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
DECREE ARE UNINTELLIGIBLE AND CONFLICTING 
AND IMPOSSIBLE OF PROPER CONSTRUCTION AND 
nETERMINATION. 
There is nd testimony in the record, nor legal basis 
whatsoever to support the trial court's selection of two 
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three-month periods and one two-month period during 
the summer months as the comparable periods of time 
to determine how much water shall pass the Kingston 
Gaging Station. The designation of periods of time for 
the summer months but complete omission of any p·rovi-
sions guaranteeing the same flow of winter water to the 
lower reservoirs to fill the storage rights is without 
any reasonable explanation except that more liberal tam-
pering with the storage rights is permitted. The periods 
of time picked by the trial court are: (1) March 15 to 
June 15, (2) June 16 to September 15, and (3) Septem-
ber 16 to November 15. These arbitrarily selected per-
iods of time do not coincide with any of' the times set 
forth in the Cox Decree. Some of the Sevier County 
primary rights (Page 3 of the Cox Deeree) commence 
on April 1st and last until September 30th. Others have 
their period of use from April 1st to November 25th 
(Elsinore Bench Irrigation Co.) or April 1st to April 
30th and October 1st to October 15th. (Sevier Valley 
C-anal Co. 
The Jones Decree permits the respondents t.o 
manipulate the size of the stream flowing past Kingston 
in such a manner that very little water, if any, may be 
received on certain days while torrential floods may be 
allowed to entirely pass on down to lower users and 
in the space of one or two weeks, the entire 3-nlonth 
quota of appellants will be fulfilled. Appellants don't 
even have the assurance that a fair and impartial river 
commissioner will see that such an arbitrary thing will 
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not occur. The arbitrary and unconscionable effects of 
the Jones Decree will be as varied and diverse as is 
the number of lower users, each with their different 
specified time of use. (R. 504) This system of each 
lower user depending on the return flow of an upper 
appropriator's USE that is now well established under 
the Cox Decree has been altered and materially renounced. 
Consideration of these effects in the change of time 
of return flow prompted the State Engineer to find: 
"Because of the periods fixed by stipulation 
and decree, the time of return flow is important 
and any change will upset the system as it has 
been operating for many years." (State Engi-
neer's Ex. No. 1) 
Why the trial court summarily selected these periods 
of time in its determination of the flow past Kingston 
will always be a mystery to app-ellants. 
During the month of January, as shown by plain-
tiffs' Exhibit G, (reproduced at page ____ of this brief) 
the flow at Kingston has varied from 85.2 cubic second 
feet ( 1949) to 195 cubic se·cond feet ( 1942). During the 
month of May the flow has varied at Kingston from 
52.5 feet (1940) and 34.7 feet (1946) to 775 feet (1941) 
and 521 feet (1942). These figures illustrate the wide 
variation in flow at Kingston and the great latitude 
which is allowed respondents in choosing and selecting 
some ''similar periods of time in previous similar 
years''. The Jones Decree is not at all clear on just 
how the computation of the flow at Kingston is t.o be 
arrived at. In Finding No. 21 it is stated: 
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''. . . . that a reasonaply accurate computation 
of such future flow can be made, taking the 
average comparable month or s·eason of years of 
similar amount of snow fali water content and 
precipitation, disaster and unusual flood waters 
excepted.'' ( J udgmerit Roll 55) 
NO record has been kept of the amount of water which 
has passed Kingston which could be classified as un-
-tisual flood waters or :teaching Kingston by reasons of 
disiister. Paragraph 1 of the amended Conclusions of 
Law states that respondents should deliver to the King-
ston Gaging Station. 
" .... a volume of water in an amount at least 
equal to the average volume of the same period 
(unseasonable floods and 'breaks' e~cluded) of 
s:tt"ow, and rain; said computation to be based on 
a volume for the said peribd and not as of any 
particular day, . . . ' ' 
These different provisions are conflicting and impossible 
of determinati9~·. There is no such thing as an average 
comparable month. There might be a month with a 
similar snow fall and water content and a "genii" 
might anticipate· the temperatures which ·control snow 
melt and the rate o£ runoff in the spring time, but any 
average for the volume·· of flow past the Kingston Sta-
tion would be vastly different from the comparable flow 
for any previous similar month. And what does Find-
ing 21 mean when it says: ''taking the average com-
parable month or season of years''' Does this permit 
respondents to take any average comparable month 
or in the alternative, and at their option a season of 
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years as a basis for determining the future flow past 
Kingston~ The ten-year average flow past Kingston 
for the month of June has been 164.5 monthly mean 
second feet, but within that ten-year period of time the 
flo'v has varied from 9.2 ·cubic second feet (1946) tq 
481 cubic second feet (1941). It would be impossible 
for respondents to deliver at Kingston in each montl~ 
the average flow that has been received there over 
the past ten years. There will be future years in wh~ch 
the Sevie~ River does not produce an average flow of 
water. In such years there would be no humanly pos-
sible way for respondents to produce the necessary water 
to make up the average flow. In any event respondents 
are not entitled to the flow of the river that exceeds 
the average flov1. By specifying the three-month periods, 
March 16 to June 15 and June 16 to September 15 the 
Decree further complicates the problem and thus en-
larges the margin of leeway allowed respondents in 
determining what the flow of the river at the Kingston 
Gaging Station shall be. 
The Supreme Court must k~ep in mind that the 
vested rights of appellants is to receive the same amount 
of water that they have in the past and that the trial 
court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate water rights in 
j holding that appellants are not entitled to receive ''un-
~ seasonable heavy flows of water". The administering 
~ of the Jones Decree in a manner satisfactory to appel-
~ lants is utterly impossible. Appellants' crops may ''burn 
rt.1 up'' for lack of wat~r in August but respondents will 
t1f 
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contend that they delivered their three-month quota 
by the middle of September. Delivery at this later 
period of time will nevertheless impair appellants' 
vested rights. Appellants contend that the trial court 
in this proceeding lacked jurisdiction to change or mod-
(ify the terms of the Cox Decree and therefore they are 
entitled to the same amount of water that they have 
been accustomed to receiving under that Decree. If the 
appellants were to sue the respondents for damages for 
failure to deliver the amount of water to which they 
are entitled under the Cox Decree, the problem would 
resolve itself into a battle of experts. A jury would 
have to resolve the conflicting testimony as to how 
much water appellants would have received in the event 
that respondents had not stored water and had not 
irrigated 5000 new acres of land. The ''ratio decidendi'' 
of the Jones Decree is that respondents cannot achieve 
their proposed changes without impairing appellants 
vested rights. The future litigation that is threatened 
by respondents' attempt to proceed under the Jones 
Decree is limitless. And yet the court decided that: 
''it should in effect open the gates so as to permit 
the construction of not only this, ·but I gather 
from the evidence, oth~r applications which are 
or \vill be filed." (R. 1118) 
POINT 7 
THE DECREE IS ERRONEOUS IN THAT IT IS AD-
MINISTRATIVELY UNWORKABLE. 
\\~ritten by the Attorney General for State F~ngin0er. 
The scope of this Point is limited to a di!.-'eussion of 
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the findings, conclusions and decree as they affect the 
administration of the Sevier River by the State Engi-
neer. Substantive rules of water law and the rights 
of these litigants thereunder are not here considered. 
It is sought to be demonstrated that a river commis-
sioner cannot administer the distribution of the water 
of the Sevier River in accordance with the ,Plan incor-
porated in the lower court's decree and that it was error 
for the lower court to relieve or attempt to relieve the 
State Engineer of any of his statutory duties relative 
to the administration of the waters of this state. 
It is not clear from the findings whose duty the 
lower court deemed it to be to see to it that the decree 
is carried out. Finding number 19 contains this language: 
" .... but in view of the fact that the applicants 
propose, in addition to setting up an on-call sys-
tem at Hatch, to also irrigate new lands in Gar-
field County and to level and otherwise mod-
ernize the farm lands in Piute and Garfield Coun-
ties, all of which would ordinarily entail a very 
complicated situation insofar as the distribution 
of the water of the South Fork of the Sevier 
River is concerned and that the State Engineer 
and the water commissioner should not be charged 
with the direct responsibility of seeing to it that 
the defendants get their full water rights at 
Kingston Station on the South Fork of the 
Sevier River between 16 March and 14 November, 
inclusive, of each year while plaintiffs operate 
under said applications, but that duty should be 
charged to Plaintiffs as a condition to the ap-
proval of their several applications.'' 
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Uta:q. ~tatute~ ~d cases ~~~a.l!lY ~p.dicate th~t the 
respon~ibility anq d11t-y of a,~inisteJing th~ rivers o~ 
this state lie~ with the State Engi~~er. The decree 
itself and part~cularly paragraphs 7 and 8 thereof here-
inafter set forth, does provide that the State Engineer 
in aid of the court shall summ~rily dispose of any 
disputes between the river commissioner~ and the plain-
tiffs. We submit, however, that the findings, conclu-
sions and decree, considered as a whole, attempt to re-
lieve the State Engineer of at least a part of his stat~­
tory duties and to impose those duties on the plain-
tiffs, and to this extent we believe that the lower court 
has committed error. 
A more important objection tQ the lower court's 
decree is the formula for water distribution created by 
the decree. The d~cree provi4es in paragraphs 7 and 8: 
"7. That the approval of said application i~ 
further conditioned as follows: That during the 
eight-month period from March 16th of each year 
to November 14th of each year, at such times 
as the applicants, or any of them, are either 
storing all, or a portion of their water in the 
reservoir or applying water to the lands as pro-
vided in applications No. a-2371, a-2372, a-2373, 
the yield of the river at Kingston measuring sta-
tion on the South Fork of the Sevier River shall 
be maintained as it would have been under sin1ilar 
periods of time (see paragraph 8 below) in previ-
ous similar years. All available information con-
cerning conditions of water shed, snow cover, 
rainfall infiltration runoff, te1nperature, and 
other pertinent factors shall be eonsidered in 
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making the determination of the river yield at 
Kingston Measuring Station on the South Fork of 
the Sevier River. And should any dispute arise 
between the River Commissioners and the plain-
tiffs concerning the amount of water to be above 
specified, such dispute shall be referred by either 
or both of said parties to the State Engineer who 
shall (in aid of the court) summarily determine 
such question, using the formula set out in this 
and the following paragraph of this Decree. 
''8. The computations of the volume of water 
to be so delivered by applicants at said Kingston 
Measuring Station on said South Fork of the 
Sevier River are to be based on the following 
volumes and periods of time (all at said Kingston 
Measuring Station on the South Fork of said 
Sevier River) : 
(1) The volume of river yield for the three-
month period March 16 to June 15, normally a 
period of high river yield, and 
(2) The volumes for the three-month period 
June 16 to September 15, normally a· period of 
low water yield, and 
(3) The volumes for the two-month period 
September 16 to November 14.'' 
f mplicit in the decree is an apparent recognition that 
the Hatch Town project cannot go forward at the ex-
pense of a taking of water rights of users of the lower 
part of the river system. In an attempt to obviate 
such damage, it is provided that a certain yield of 
water must, between certain time intervals, flow past 
the Kingston Gaging Station, the point in the river 
which geographically divides the applicants from the 
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protes~ants. -The paragraphs quoted above set forth 
the amounts of water and the periods of time determined 
. . 
upon by the court. Briefly. summarized, it is provided 
th-at the yield at Kingston shall remain '' ... be main-
tained as it would have been under similar periods of 
time (see pa:ragraph 8 below) in previous similar years.'' 
The specified periods are : first, M·arch 16-J une 15, sec-
ond, June 16-September ~5 ; third, September 16-N ovenl-
ber 14. Disputes, if any, are to.be.determined summarily 
by the State Engineer in aid of the Court. 
The flow of a river depends upon many factors, some 
of which are depth of snow cover; water content of 
snow ; time incidences at which the seasons commence; 
abruptness or gradualness of temperature changes from 
season to ·season; absorptive qualities of the soil; wind 
factors ; rain storms ; rainfall infiltration runoff; the 
extent to which farmers along the river system deem 
it desirable to us·e their decreed rights. 
In listing such factors an attempt has been made 
not to duplicate. Some of those listed, however, neces-
sarily overlap in part. As an example, the absorptive 
quality of soil is a complex factor which involves in 
part soil physics which does not change materially from 
year to year although there may be some change tf 
different lands are irrigated and in part frost depth, 
which of course in turn is dependent upon temperature 
season incidence and soil moisture. And plainly the 
factor of the extent to which a water user fully uses 
his decreed rights is a factor \v·hieh depends upon several 
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of the others listed (e.g., rainfall) in additio~ to the 
irrigation practices and psychological makeup of the 
particular water user involved. Actually there are other 
factors, and those together with the ones listed combine 
and interrelate in such a way that an infinite number 
of combinations become possible. Run-off in a drainage 
system depends also to a large extent upon conditions 
created by the fall and winter of the previous year. ..A. 
long cold fall which makes for deep ground frost, fol-
lowed by a short winter of deep snows, followed by a 
suddenly warm springtime, combine to make for a 
short, heavy, early run-off. If but one of these factors 
is varied, the result is a variance of the quantity of the 
run-off, a variance of its peak intensity, a variance of 
the time at which the peak comes and a varian·ce of 
length of time that run-off continues. Records of river 
yield at the Kingston Gaging Station kept for forty 
years indicate that there has been no year in that 
whole period of time which can be considered to be simi-
lar to another year. 
The choice of the ''previous similar years '' will 
be, therefore, largely guess work, and, of course, it is 
a guess wltich in its nature can never be demonstrated 
to have been correct or incorrect. Grave dissatisfaction 
among the users of water ~f the Sevier River, where 
water is as important as it is anywhere in this state 
or in the west, is inevitable. It is submitted that a 
proper decree should not only protect vested rights: 
a proper decree is one which can be demonstrated to 
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be correct so that a water user whose livelihood depends 
upon protection of his rights will have some confidence 
in the statutory system of water administration. 
Another difficulty with which the river commis-
sioner would be faced lies in an ambiguity in the 
language of the decree which requires that the river 
yield at Kingston be "maintained as it would have been 
under similar periods of time . . . in previous similar 
years.'' A serious problem is whether the ''similar 
periods'' must all be taken from whatever ''previous 
similar year'' was chosen by the river commissioner at 
the outset of the irrigation season. The situation can per-
haps be better illustrated by example: Assume that the 
river commissioner, early in the year 1956, decided 
that perhaps 1931 is the best choice for the previous 
''similar'' year. Near the close of the first period 
(March 16-June 15 ), his records show that not enough 
water has passed Kingston and he therefore requires 
that the applicants release more water, so that by June 
15th the 1931 figure for the first period is reached. 
There arises then the problem whether, for the second 
period, the commissioner may or must alter his plan 
so as to adopt for the second period, the year, say, 1939, 
which now appears to be more nearly "similar" in the 
light of the course of the spring weather. 
The farmers who irrigate with Sevier River water 
can be divided into groups with adverse interest. IJiti-
gants grouped together in this case as protestants in 
many ways havP opposing interests: the storage rights 
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represented for example, are benefited at the expense 
of diversion rights if river yield is very high very early. 
This means, of course, that it is not enough for tlie 
State Enginee:t; to see to it that a fair quantity of water 
passes the Kingston Gaging Station. To avoid injustices, 
and litigation, the administrative officer in charge o:f 
the river must also see to it that the time factor is 
strictly observed and that the right quantity of water 
--flows past Kingston at exactly the right time. 
It may appear on casual reading that the difficulties 
suggested here are imagined or manufactured.. However, 
it is a fact which coun'Sel for the State Engineer 
are keenly aware of, that it is peculiarly difficult to 
present with clarity a picture of the administrative 
problem with which that office is faced. These objections 
are not frivolously tendered. And more is involved in 
such a problem as is here presented than the potential 
embarrassment of a public office; for an attempt to 
solve with fairness a problem to which there is no 
solution is certain to result in dissatisfaction and end-
less litigation. It is obvious that, should the decree be 
affirmed, as each ''similar quarterly period'' nears its 
close, the office of the State Engineer will be the recipi-
ent of suggestions, pressures, and· expressions of dis-
content from water users up and down the river. This 
is inevitable on a river system as mature and as over-
appropriated as is the Sevier. 
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CONCLUSION 
In Eardley vs. Terry, et al., 94 Utah 367, 77 P. 2d 
362, and United States vs. District Court (Utah 1951) 
238 P. 2d 1132, this court stated : 
''All that the district court or this court on 
appeal from the district court is called upon to 
do is to determine whether the application should 
be rejected or approved.'' (Emphasis added) 
And thus appellants contend that because of the errors 
outlined in this brief, the district court's Judgment and 
Decree should be reversed and the decision of the State 
Engineer reinstated. 
The respondents under the guise of seeking a: 
''change-application'' have attempted to appropriate 
additional amounts of water which have never before 
been needed or used by them. Their proposal to store 
winter rights, (now non-consumptive) for summer use 
on the same lands and to irrigate 5000 new acres far 
removed from the river where the water will be com-
pletely consumed, cannot operate without impairing the 
vested rights of lower users. The Cox Decree, which 
after 17 years of administration by the water com-
missioners now functions so well, will be rescinded inso-
far as its principles of TIME and USE have heretofore 
applied to respondents. 
The present record conclusively indicates that appel-
lants vested rights will be impaired if respondents pro-
ceed in accordance ~th their applications to develop 
and irrigate the 5000 new acres besides storing winter 
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water for use in the summer months on lands for which 
they now have a sufficient summer right. The State 
Engineer's decision in rejecting respondents' applica-
tions should be reinstated and the Decree of the trial 
court reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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